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ABSTRACT 
 
For	decades,	courts	and	commentators	have	been	aware	that	the	potential	
for	conflicting	 interests	among	the	class	representatives,	class	counsel,	and	
absent	class	members	is	inherent	in	the	class	action	device.		Notwithstanding	
this	 realization	 and	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 scholarly	 and	 judicial	
commentary	 on	 class	 conflicts,	 one	 kind	 of	 conflict	 has	 not	 received	 due	
attention:	 the	 conflict	 that	 inevitably	 arises	 when	 class	 counsel	 also	
represents	class	members	as	individuals.		We	demonstrate	that	this	conflict—
so	 common	 to	 be	 almost	 invisible—arises	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 a	
putative	class	representation,	and	may	create	a	fraught	situation	for	a	lawyer	
concurrently	 representing	 both	 the	 class	 (or	 putative	 class)	 and	 the	 class	
representative	 individually.	 	We	 examine	 three	 situations	 in	 which	 these	
conflicts	are	most	acute:	holdouts	(where	the	class	representative	holds	out	
against	a	settlement	that	would	benefit	the	class	as	a	whole),	sellouts	(where	
the	class	representative	could	benefit	personally	by	settling	individual	claims	
only),	 and	 payouts	 (where	 the	 class	 representative	 could	 use	 class	 action	
procedures	 to	 benefit	 personally	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 class).	 	We	 canvas	
potential	 solutions	 and	 conclude	 that	 radical	 ones—for	 instance,	 banning	
concurrent	representation	of	a	class	and	a	class	member	individually—would	
do	 more	 harm	 than	 good.	 We	 therefore	 recommend	 more	 measured	
responses,	primarily	 (1)	greater	disclosure	of	 risks	 to	 individual	 clients	by	
their	attorneys,	(2)	greater	judicial	oversight,	and	(3)	an	amendment	to	Rule	
23	of	the	Federal	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure,	or	 its	advisory	committee	notes,	
calling	on	courts	to	police	the	types	of	conflict	we	identify.	
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An attorney seeking to represent a class ordinarily begins by 
representing one or more plaintiffs individually.1  The clients may be 
                                                 
1 See,	e.g., 6 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 19:2 (5th ed. 2011-19) [hereinafter NEWBERG] (“[A]n attorney seeking to 
represent, or representing, a class will almost certainly have an attorney-client 
relationship with the class representatives . . . If the class is certified, the individual client 
likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for all purposes.”). Similarly, 
formation of an individual attorney-client relationship is common when preparing to seek 
appointment as a lead plaintiff-class counsel tandem in a class action already filed by 
someone else. This occurs frequently in putative securities class actions, where the 
relevant statute makes clear that a class member who has not filed a complaint may be 
appointed to be the lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
For examples of retainer agreements which provide for an individual representation 
first, followed by an attempt to obtain class certification and add the class as a client, see 
Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 84-2, BABB	Real	Estate	LLC	v.	Bennett	Shelaine, 
No. 3:10-cv-00119 (W.D. Wisc.); Retainer Agreement for Legal Services, ECF No. 57-1, 
Lopez	v.	Delta	Airlines	Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04497 (C.D. Cal.); Schoengold & Sporn, P.C. Letter 
of Engagement, https://www.spornlaw.com/class_action.php; Shepherd Finkelman Miller 
& Shah LLP, Retainer Agreement, http://www.hallandalebeachfl.gov/files/2012-05-
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institutional investors who have potential securities law claims, or 
individuals with potential consumer law, employment, or civil rights claims, 
among others.2  The practice raises important questions about conflicts of 
interest. Courts, class actions lawyers, and commentators have not 
sufficiently appreciated the problem.  
 
 Before filing a class action, the lawyer owes ethical and fiduciary 
duties—for instance, loyalty, competence and confidentiality—exclusively 
to the clients individually.  Even after the lawyer files a class action 
complaint on behalf of the client, or files a motion for appointment of lead 
plaintiff and lead counsel in an already-filed action, the lawyer presumably 
must represent the client individually at least until the court certifies the 
class, because, until then, the named plaintiff, not the class—which does not 
yet exist—is the party to the lawsuit.  Throughout this time, the individual 
client may seek counsel’s disinterested legal advice, first, about whether to 
bring an individual claim or a class action, and whether to apply to serve as 
a lead plaintiff in a class action, and later, about whether to seek a 
settlement, and other issues.  
 
 Case law, the professional literature, and publicly available retainer 
agreements3 indicate that as a class action lawsuit progresses, lawyers for 
the class customarily continue their individual representations.4  There is 
no evidence that the lawyers, perceiving that they have a conflict of interest, 
                                                 
02/Item%209C/SUPP_DOCS/Documents/Doc2.rtf.   
2 Professor Fitzpatrick’s study of all federal court class actions settled in a two-year 
period (2006 and 2007) found that the most common kinds of class actions were securities 
cases (37%), labor and employment (14%), consumer (13%), employee benefits (9%), 
civil rights (9%), debt collection (6%), antitrust (4%), and commercial (2%). See Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, An	 Empirical	 Study	 of	 Class	 Action	 Settlements	 and	 Their	 Fee	 Awards, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 811, 818 (2010).  
3 Although we have not conducted a systematic study, we have reviewed several dozen 
retainer agreements that are publicly-available on PACER, the websites of class action law 
firms, and websites devoted to settlements in particular class actions. We limited ourselves 
to class action litigation in federal courts, and sought agreements from a variety of kinds 
of class actions. We found no agreements which discussed ending the individual client 
relationship after class certification. Many of the agreements we reviewed are cited 
throughout this article. 
4 An individual representation alongside a class representation is more likely to occur 
where the litigation could have a more than nominal value to an individual plaintiff.  See,	
e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who	Should	Regulate	Class	Action	Lawyers?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147, 
1497-98. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr.,	 Class	 Action	 Accountability:	 Reconciling	 Exit,	 Voice,	 and	
Loyalty	in	Representative	Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2000) (discussing a mass 
tort action with both individual and class representation by the same lawyers). 
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commonly seek the informed consent of their individual clients or the 
approval of the court to the joint representation of both the class and lead 
plaintiffs as individual claimants.5   
 
In a class action in federal court, district court judges principally 
address a lawyer’s conflicts of interest at two stages.  First, in deciding 
which lawyer to appoint as class counsel, and whether that lawyer can 
“fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,”6 courts may 
consider whether the loyalty and competence of the lawyer would be 
compromised by the lawyer’s duties to other current or former clients or 
by the lawyer’s own competing interests.7  Second, in determining the 
fairness of proposed settlements,8 which are far more common than trials,9 
judges may consider whether class counsel’s negotiations or decisions were 
compromised by a conflict of interest.10  (Sometimes courts address 
                                                 
5 We have seen the occasional retainer agreement that hints at the issue. See,	 e.g., 
Authority to Represent and Retainer Agreement for Class Action Lawsuit, ECF No. 84-2, In	
re	Ocean	Fin.	Corp.	Prescreening	Litig., No. 06-C-3515 (N.D. Ill.) (“I understand that if My 
Attorneys are approved as class counsel, they may owe duties and responsibilities to all 
members of the class, rather than to me alone. I hereby consent to My Attorneys acting as 
class counsel if the court so designates them.”). 
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4). Before subsection (g) was added in 2003 specifically 
addressing the appointment of class counsel, “courts . . . scrutinized proposed class counsel 
. . . under Rule 23(a)(4),” Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments to Rule 23, Fed. R. 
Civ. P., which requires that “the representative parties” be able and likely to “fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.” See	also	Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997) (stating that the adequacy of representation inquiry involves 
looking at the “competency and conflicts of class counsel”). 
7 See,	e.g., Winiger v. SI Management L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
question of whether there is an ethical conflict forms part of the class certification 
question.”).  
8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal [for settlement] would bind class 
members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate after considering whether: (A) the class representatives and 
class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at 
arm’s length . . . .”). 
9 Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 812 (“[V]irtually all cases certified as class actions and not 
dismissed before trial end in settlement”).   
10 See,	e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856-57 (1999) (reversing approval 
of a class action settlement because, among other reasons, class counsel represented 
groups with conflicting interests); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 356 F.2d 781, 785 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (“Because class actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest between class 
counsel and class members, . . . district judges presiding over such actions are expected to 
give careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlements in order to make sure that class 
counsel are behaving as honest fiduciaries for the class as a whole.”) (citations omitted).  
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conflicts at other procedural stages, for instance, in determining the amount 
of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.)  There is a substantial literature on 
conflicts of interest in class actions.11  But courts, class action lawyers, and 
commentators have not analyzed, and rarely even acknowledge, a conflict 
of interest that is ubiquitous in class actions—namely, the conflict of 
interest that inheres when counsel for a class concurrently represents class 
representatives as individual clients.12  
 
Lawyers may assume that they can continue to represent class 
representatives throughout the lawsuit because the interests of the class 
representatives are largely aligned with those of the class.  To certify a class, 
the court will have to determine that these proposed class representatives 
are “members” of the class, have claims “typical” of the class, and will “fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”13  Moreover, the class 
representatives agree to assume fiduciary duties to the class.14  But, in fact, 
                                                 
11 On intra-class conflicts, that is, on the differing interests of different members of the 
class see, for example, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving	Two	Masters:	Integration	Ideals	and	Client	
Interests	 in	School	Desegregation	Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Class	 Action	 Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts	 of	
Interest	 in	Class	Action	Litigation:	An	Inquiry	 into	the	Appropriate	Standard, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 581; Deborah L. Rhode, Class	Conflicts	in	Class	Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).  
For a discussion of the conflict between the class counsel’s financial interests and the 
class’s interests, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The	 Regulation	 of	 Entrepreneurial	 Litigation:	
Balancing	Fairness	and	Efficiency	in	the	Large	Class	Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); 
Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart”	and	“Blackmail”	Settlements	in	Class	Actions:	
Reality	and	Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000); Benjamin R. Edwards & 
Anthony Rickey, Uncovering	 the	 Hidden	 Conflicts	 in	 Securities	 Class	 Action	 Litigation:	
Lessons	 from	 the	 State	 Street	 Case, BUSINESS LAWYER (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364470. For a discussion of the 
conflict when one lawyer represents different classes in different actions against the same 
defendant, see Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing	Peter	to	Pay	Paul:	The	Conflict	
of	Interest	Problem	in	Sibling	Class	Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195 (2008).   
12 For acknowledgements of this problem, see Moore, supra note 4, at 1489, 1497-98, 
1500-01; Mary Kay Kane,	Of	Carrots	and	 Sticks:	Evaluating	 the	Role	of	 the	Class	Action	
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 393, 396, 398-99 (1987); Developments	in	the	Law‐Conflicts	of	
Interest	 in	the	Legal	Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1446-54 (1981).  For a summary 
rejection of the suggestion that a conflict could be posed for class counsel by also 
representing an absent class member individually, see Borum v. Brentwood Village LLC, 
No. 16-1723, 2019 WL 2437686, at *11 (D.D.C. June 11, 2019). 
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). On the standards governing the adequacy of class 
representatives, see,	e.g., Amchem	Products, 521 U.S. at 624-26 & n.20; Debra Lyn Bassett, 
When	Reform	is	Not	Enough:	Assuring	More	Than	Merely	‘Adequate’	Representation	in	Class	
Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 965 (2004). 
14 See,	e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that named plaintiffs have “fiduciary duties to the class”); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548872
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the class representatives’ interests may diverge from those of the class, 
either because the individuals’ interests are not perfectly aligned with those 
of the class as a whole,15 or because the class action procedure enables them 
to benefit financially at the class’s expense.16  Notwithstanding their 
fiduciary undertaking, representative plaintiffs may act in their own self-
interest.17  Courts know this, because published decisions describe 
situations where class counsel could not competently and loyally represent 
both the class and a self-interested class representative.18  But courts do not 
require class counsel to avoid this risk by withdrawing from the 
representation of individual class members when the class is certified.  Nor 
would that entirely solve the problem, since lawyers are expected to act in 
the interest of the putative class even prior to class certification, as 
described below. 
 
This article explores the problem of conflicts arising from class 
counsel’s concurrent representation of a class and individual 
representative plaintiffs.19  We analyze lawyers’ duties and conflicts from 
the perspective of both federal court case law and the ethics rules adopted 
throughout the United States based on the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.20 We acknowledge that ethics 
                                                 
404 F.3d 173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lead plaintiff serves as a fiduciary for the entire 
class.”); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that from the 
time a class complaint is filed, class representatives have “a fiduciary obligation towards 
the members of the putative class they thus have undertaken to represent”). 
15 See,	e.g., 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:7 (“Counsel in a class action lawsuit represents 
both one or more individual clients (as class representatives) and a large group of absent 
class members. It is somewhat inevitable that there will be fissures within such a large 
group of litigants.”); Miller, supra note 11, at 581 (observing that “[c]onflicts of interest 
pervade class action litigation” in part because of “the potential for members of the class 
to be differently situated”); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.14 at 492 (1986) 
(“Conflict is rife within the structure of the class itself. Most obviously, the class 
representative may have interests and goals that in fact are not shared by represented by 
absent class members.”). 
16 See Part II, infra.  
17 See,	e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking	Adequacy	of	Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 
1151 (2009) (describing the “indifference” to the class’s interests of “class representatives 
. . . who are willing to represent the interests of class members only to the extent that such 
representations serve their own interests”). 
18 See Part I, infra.  
19 The same issues may arise when class counsel also represents an absent class 
member as an individual client.  However, we focus on the representation of lead plaintiffs. 
20 See American Bar Association, Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model 
Rules (last updated March 28, 2018), 
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rules expressly address class actions only sporadically and provide little 
specific guidance.21  Further, as discussed below, some courts and 
commentators believe in disregarding ethics rules when they conflict with 
the goals and policies of class actions.22  Nevertheless, exploring the 
conflicts in class actions through the lens of conflict-of-interest rules23 and 
doctrine is illumining, because the rules encapsulate widely-shared, long-
persisting views about conflicts that are deeply influential.24  And the 
conflict rules govern all lawyers, including plaintiff-side class action 
lawyers.  Even if the rules might be a poor fit for a class representation—a 
possibility we address below—the rules and the client interests they 
protect are indisputably relevant to assessing how class action lawyers are 
treating their individual clients.  The rules’ framework provides a valuable 
benchmark against which to measure how well class action decisional law 
addresses the conflicts we discuss here.  Although we support federal 
courts’ current approach of addressing conflicts primarily via case-by-case 
adjudication, highlighting how and where current case law has departed 
from the rules helps ground our suggestions for reforming case law. 
 
Ethics rules recognize that lawyers have a “concurrent conflict of 
interest” if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client.”25 The conflict can be waived if the affected clients give informed 
consent in writing and the lawyer “reasonably believes” that he or she “will 
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client.”26  Federal courts addressing conflicts issues in class actions often 
acknowledge this standard but freely adopt their own approach when they 
disagree with what the Rules seem to require.  Federal courts and 
                                                 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/. California 
adopted new rules based on the ABA Model Rules effective in November 2018. See The 
State Bar of California, New Rules of Professional Conduct Effective November 1, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News-Events/News-Releases/new-rules-of-
professional-conduct-effective-november-1. 
21 See,	e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 1478. 
22 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
23 See	generally Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
24 See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts	of	Interest	in	Litigation:	The	Judicial	Role, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 71, 99 (1996) (“The conflict rules, promulgated by courts based on the ABA models, 
are rooted in common law principles that are more than a century old.”). 
25 Rule 1.7(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
26 Id., Rule 1.7(b). 
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commentators frequently suggest that conflicts rules cannot be 
“mechanically” applied to the class action setting,27 and that if ethics rules 
conflict with the needs of making class actions viable, the ethics rules must 
be softened or give way entirely.28  For example, courts often do not 
disqualify class counsel who have what would ordinarily be a disabling 
conflict of interest.29  This article illuminates what is lost when the Model 
Rules framework for conflicts is ignored or relaxed in class action practice.  
 
The article begins by exploring the magnitude of the overlooked 
problem.  Because a lawyer’s duties with regard to conflicts can defined and 
analyzed by reference to identified clients, Part I of this article provides 
necessary background by discussing the surprisingly unresolved question 
of who are the clients of class counsel at various stages of litigation.  Part I 
sets out the standard view among courts and commentators about how 
class representatives and absent class members should be protected from 
conflicts.  Part II then describes three recurring situations where the 
respective interests of a class and the class representatives may diverge, at 
times dramatically, with the result that one lawyer could not loyally and 
competently serve both the class and its representative.  Part III considers 
whether the joint representation constitutes a conflict of interest even 
before a class representative begins acting to the class’s detriment.  First, it 
discusses whether the conflict of interest exists at the time of class 
certification, because, looking ahead, there is a significant risk that the class 
representative will act self-interestedly.  Second, it considers whether 
lawyers have a conflict of interest even earlier, upon filing the class action, 
when lawyers first assume fiduciary duties to absent class members or to 
the nascent class.    
 
The article then considers the implications of the initial analysis for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, rulemakers and trial courts.  Part IV argues that before 
lawyers file a class action, they must explain how the class action will limit 
                                                 
27 See,	e.g., In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 102 (2d Cir. 
2003) (“[T]he traditional rules concerning conflict-free representation, applicable in non-
class suits, ‘should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement 
of class action litigation.’”) (quoting Agent	Orange, 800 F.2d at  19); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 
1, § 19:1 (“Class action practice has a peculiar relationship to legal ethics. . . . [C]ourts 
cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the traditional 
lawyer-client setting context.”). 
28 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
29 See,	e.g., Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(declining to disqualify former class counsel from presenting an unnamed class member’s 
challenge to a settlement, finding the conflict of interest was not sufficiently “serious”). 
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their ability to act and give advice for the individual’s benefit, and how they 
will respond if a conflict of interest later precludes serving both the client 
and the class.  This Part demonstrates the inadequacy of courts’ and 
commentators’ standard approach—namely, that class counsel will give 
primary loyalty to the class as a whole, and that the district court will 
monitor for and resolve conflicts when they become overt.  
 
Part V suggests that federal rulemakers should amend Rule 23 to 
clarify that class counsel’s conflicts should be addressed by the courts.  
Fearing that such an amendment may be unlikely, the remainder of Part V 
addresses courts’ responsibility to protect the class under existing law.  It 
asks whether trial judges have a responsibility under Rule 23 to forbid, or 
impose conditions on, a lawyer’s joint representation of an individual class 
representative and the class or nascent class.  This Part also discusses the 
implications of this dilemma for courts exercising their responsibility for 
interpreting both professional conduct rules and civil procedure rules as 
well as their responsibility for supervising class actions and class counsel 
to protect the interests of the class and ensure lawyers’ compliance with 
professional expectations.  Among other things, we conclude that courts 
should clarify the applicability of conflict rules; and they should clarify class 
counsel’s responsibilities to the class vis-à-vis class representatives at 
different stages of the lawsuit. 
 
In undertaking this inquiry, we focus on practice in federal courts, 
where most class actions are filed.30 Although our analysis may also apply 
to collective actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we 
exclude such suits from our coverage here.  Both class actions and FLSA 
collective actions involve lead plaintiffs and lead counsel controlling a suit 
on behalf of other similarly-situated plaintiffs; however, the FLSA expressly 
provides that all aggregated plaintiffs have the status of formal parties.31 
There are thus no “absent” class members in a formal sense in FLSA 
litigation.  Nor do we address non-class aggregate litigation,32 although 
                                                 
30 See Morris A. Ratner, Class	Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. REV. 785, 843 (2017) (observing that 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 “has successfully shifted much class practice to 
federal court.”) (citing Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s	Impact	on	Class	Action	Lawyers, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1593, 1607-14 (2008)). 
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see	also Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 
215, 225 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing this difference between Rule 23 class actions and FLSA 
collective actions).  
32 As it has become harder to certify mass tort cases as class actions, aggregation of 
those cases has increasingly occurred through the multi-district litigation (MDL) 
procedures in federal court. See,	 e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, “A	 Radical	 Proposal”:	 The	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548872
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multi-strict litigation (MDL) aggregation has much in common with class 
action representation.33  Our analysis may have broader implications, but 
federal class actions afford a significant enough area on which to focus 
initially. 
 
I.  CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE: WHO IS THE CLIENT AND HOW SHOULD CLASS 
CONFLICTS BE ADDRESSED?  
 
Even after decades of litigation under Rule 23,34 basic but crucial 
questions remain uncertain: Who or what are the clients of the class action 
lawyer? At what stage do client or client-like relationships begin? What 
duties and responsibilities do class counsel have? What rights and 
responsibilities do clients have?  Can ethics rules (based on the ABA Model 
Rules) about client identity, conflicts of interest, and other topics, written 
for non-class actions, be applied to class actions also, or must ethics rules 
be ignored or modified in the class action context?    
 
A.		The	Unresolved	Problem	of	Identifying	the	Clients	
 
 Before filing a class action or seeking appointment as lead counsel in 
a putative class action filed by another, a lawyer ordinarily establishes a 
lawyer-client relationship in the matter with one or more members of the 
prospective class.35  The lawyer’s ethical and fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
                                                 
Multidistrict	 Litigation	 Act	 of	 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 833 (2017); William B. 
Rubenstein, Procedure	and	Society:	An	Essay	for	Steve	Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136, 
144 n.40 (2013).  Mass tort cases aggregated via MDL differ in relevant respects from the 
class actions we address here: All plaintiffs individually retain lawyers and negotiate 
individual contracts with them, and those representations continue as both a formal and 
practical matter throughout the litigation.	 	See,	e.g., Morris Ratner, Achieving	Procedural	
Goals	through	Indirection:	The	Use	of	Ethics	Doctrine	to	Justify	Contingency	Fee	Caps	in	MDL	
Aggregate	Settlements, 26 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 59, 64 (2013).  
33 For instance, the court appoints a small subset of plaintiffs’ lawyers as lead counsel 
to perform common benefit work for all plaintiffs,	see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The	 Quasi‐Class	 Action	 Method	 of	 Managing	 Multi‐District	 Litigations:	 Problems	 and	 A	
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 118 (2010), and the lawyers operate largely autonomously 
from client control, see Charles Silver, The	Responsibilities	of	Lead	Lawyers	and	Judges	in	
Multidistrict	Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011). 
34 The modern version of the class action rule (Rule 23) was adopted in 1966. See 
Advisory Comm. Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23.  Use of the class action device 
increased substantially after these amendments. See	generally Scott Dodson, A	Negative	
Retrospective	of	Rule	23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 921 (2017).  
35 Some lawyers specify that the relationship extends only to deciding whether to seek 
appointment as lead plaintiff and class counsel, and litigating any class certification motion 
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competence, and confidentiality belong exclusively to the individual client. 
The clarity of the lawyer’s role ends here, however.   
 
After filing the class action complaint but prior to certification, 
counsel has no “formal” attorney-client relationship with the putative 
class,36 but according to case law and official commentary on Rule 23, 
“generally must act in the class’s best interests.”37 Interim counsel for a 
putative class may be, but need not be, formally designated by the district 
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3).  Commentary on the Model Rules states 
that a lawyer seeking to represent a class is not “ordinarily” considered to 
have a lawyer-client relationship with putative absent class members for 
purposes of the principal rule on concurrent conflicts of interest, Rule 
1.7(a).38 
 
After a class is certified and a lawyer is appointed to serve as class 
counsel, the lawyer owes the class most—but not all—of the ethical and 
fiduciary duties of loyalty that lawyers ordinarily owe to clients.  Class 
counsel are said to be fiduciaries for the class as a whole.39  This means that 
                                                 
that the lawyer determines to file, and that the representation will end if the lawyer 
decides not to proceed or the judge denies appointment.	See,	e.g., Letter from Samuel H. 
Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, to Geoffrey D. Flagstad, ECF No. 80-14, City	
of	Cape	Coral	Municipal	Firefighters’	Retirement	Plan	 v.	Emergent	Biosolutions,	 Inc., No. 
8:16-cv-02624 (D. Md.) (“If the court does not certify the case as a class action, we will 
discuss representing you on a limited basis.”). 
36 See,	e.g., ABA Formal Ethics Op. 07-445 (“A lawyer-client relationship with a potential 
member of the class does not begin until the class has been certified and the time for opting 
out by a potential member of the class has expired.”). 
37 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2. See	also Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments 
to Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Whether or not formally designed interim counsel, an attorney 
who acts on behalf of the class prior to certification must act in the best interests of the 
class as a whole.”). 
38 The rule provides that: “(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Rule 1.7, ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
39 See,	e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]lass 
counsel’s fiduciary duty is to the class as a whole.”); In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 
F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that class counsel have “fiduciary duties to the 
class”); In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Keepseagle 
v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (same). See	generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4) 
(“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”); 6 
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class counsel may not serve their own interests, or someone else’s interests, 
such as those of a different client, to the detriment of the class.40  In deciding 
whether to appoint a particular lawyer to serve as class counsel, courts are 
supposed to look closely at allegations that the lawyer in question owes 
duties to others or has personal interests that will compromise the lawyer’s 
ability to give undivided loyalty to the class.41 
 
Importantly, class counsel’s duty of loyalty is to the entire class, not 
to any particular class member.42  Most courts and commentators believe 
that class counsel has a primary duty to the class and only a secondary duty 
to individual class members, even if there exists an attorney-client 
agreement to press individual claims in addition to class claims. The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, which 
added subsection (g) concerning appointment of class counsel, state that:  
“[T]he primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from 
appointment as class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the 
class. The rule thus establishes the obligation of class counsel, an 
obligation that may be different from the customary obligations of 
counsel to individual clients.” 
This commentary apparently arose from debates about whether to adopt 
an “entity theory” of the class, under which the role of class representatives 
would decline or perhaps be eliminated.43  
                                                 
NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:20 (“The class counsel-class representative relationship 
within the class action is treated as an attorney-client relationship.”).  
40 See,	 e.g., Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 934, 938–39 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that “certified representatives and the class counsel assume[ ] certain fiduciary 
responsibilities to the Class,” and as a result, “the certified representatives may not take 
any action which will prejudice the Class's interest, or further their personal interests at 
the expense of the Class”). 
41 See,	e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 607-08 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale 
Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 36 & n.12 (1st Cir. 2009); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 
§ 21.271 at 279 (2004). 
42 See,	e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1167 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“Class counsel has a fiduciary duty to the class as a whole.”); Agent	Orange, 
800 F.2d at 18 (“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to the plaintiff's named in the 
caption of the case; it runs to all of the members of the class”).  
43 See Edward H. Cooper, Rule	23:	Challenges	to	the	Rulemaking	Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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A leading civil procedure treatise goes further than the Advisory 
Committee Notes in sidelining the individual in favor of the “class as a 
whole”: 
“The appointed class counsel represents the interests of the class as 
a whole, however, not the interest of the class representatives, and 
must be guided accordingly. . . . [A] formal court appointment as 
class counsel will inevitably shift the attorney’s allegiance from the 
attorney’s former client (the named plaintiffs) to the attorney’s new 
client (the class).”44  
This treatise goes too far in suggesting that the lead plaintiffs have 
become “former” clients of class counsel. Most lawyers, courts, and 
commentators view the individual lawyer-client relationship with named 
plaintiffs as continuing, albeit in modified form.45 Retainer agreements we 
have reviewed suggest that the attorney-client relationship formed prior to 
class certification generally is understood to continue.46 But the treatise 
does capture the common view that after certification the primary loyalty 
of the class counsel is to the class as a whole, which must be preferred over 
lead plaintiffs, whether or not they are also individual clients,47 and over 
                                                 
13, 26-327 (1996) 
44 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][i] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4)). 
45 See,	e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 
768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Beyond their ethical obligations to their clients, class attorneys, 
purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire class a fiduciary duty once the class 
complaint is filed.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he class attorney’s duty does not run just to the plaintiffs named in the caption of the 
case; it runs to all of the members of the class.”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[A]n 
attorney seeking to represent, or representing, a class will almost certainly have an 
attorney-client relationship with the class representatives . . . If the class is certified, the 
individual client likely becomes the class representative and remains a client for all 
purposes.”).  
46 See,	e.g., Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 137-34, Savanna	Group,	Inc.	v.	
Trynex,	Inc., No. 1:10-cv-07995 (N.D. Ill.); Authorization, ECF No. 16-5, Pronesti	v.	Acument	
Global	Tech.,	Inc., No. 2:08-cv-15086 (E.D. Mich.); Letter to Clemens Gaebal, Union Asset 
Mgmt. Holding AG, from William Narwold, Motley Rice (Nov. 7, 2006), ECF No. 242-4, In	re	
Dell	Inc.	Securities	Litig., No. 1:06-cv-00726 (W.D. Tex.).  
47 See,	e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978)) 
(“The attorneys themselves have an obligation to all of the class members, and ‘when a 
potential conflict arises between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class, the class 
attorney must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the named 
plaintiffs.’”); Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983) 
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absent class members.  
 
This “solution” would fail in a regular setting of an attorney with two 
concurrent clients with conflicting interests. Under the Model Rules, a 
lawyer who undertakes a joint representation may not favor one co-client 
over another: doing so would be the very definition of a conflict of interest. 
 
  Although class counsel has something akin to an attorney-client 
relationship with those appointed by the court to serve as class 
representatives48—for example, class counsel must consult with class 
representatives49—this is not an ordinary attorney-client relationship.  The 
                                                 
(“Class counsel’s duty to the class as a whole frequently diverges from the opinion of either 
the named plaintiff or other objectors.”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:25 (stating that, 
when a class representative and individual client becomes an objector to class action 
settlement, “class action law unambiguously places upon class counsel a duty to act in the 
class’s best interest”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. d(iii) 
(stating that, in case of serious differences within class or between class representatives 
and absent class members, “the lawyer may proceed in what the lawyer reasonably 
concludes to be the best interests of the of the class as a whole”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.641 at 323 (2004) (“Class counsel must discuss with the class 
representatives the terms of any settlement offered to the class. Approval or rejection of 
the offer by the representatives, however, does not end the attorneys’ obligations, because 
they must act in the best interests of the class as a whole.”). 
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (“Class actions may 
pose difficult questions of client identification. For many purposes, the named class 
representatives are the clients of the lawyer for the class.”).  See	also 6 NEWBERG, supra note 
1, § 19:2 (“[R]egardless of whether the class representative was initially an individual 
client of class counsel, once a court certifies a class and appoints class representatives and 
class counsel, those parties have an attorney-client relationship with one another.”); id. § 
19:2 (“[O]nce a class has been certified, the default presumption is that there is an 
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and the absent class members.”).  
49 See,	e.g., Doe v. Briley, No. 3:73-CV-6971, 2016 WL 6125437, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 
20, 2016) (stating that class counsel violated ethical rules requiring consultation with 
clients when negotiated on behalf of class without consulting or even knowing how to 
contact lead plaintiff); Byes v. Telecheck Recovery Services, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 421, 427-29 
(E.D. La. 1997) (finding putative class counsel inadequate because, among other reasons, 
he did not convey information to the class representative about settlement offers). Cf. 
Olden v. Gardner, 294 F. App’x 210, 220 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Class representatives are 
expected to protect the interests of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). This requires that 
the class representatives exercise some oversight of the class counsel so as to avoid simply 
turning the conduct of the case over to the class counsel.”); Twelve John Does v. D.C., 117 
F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding proposed class representatives adequate in part 
because of good “communication between class counsel and the class”). But	see Banyai v. 
Mazur, No. 00-Civ-9806, 2004 WL 1948755, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004) (rejecting motion 
to replace class counsel and stating that it was not inappropriate for counsel to exclude 
class representatives from settlement negotiations). 
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class action lawyer does not take direction from the named plaintiffs, as a 
lawyer would from a client.50   “[A] class representative may not 
singlehandedly veto a proposed settlement,”51 while under the Model 
Rules, a client has an absolute right to reject any proposed settlement.52  
Under standard agency law principles, a client has the near-absolute right 
to access the lawyer’s files about her case.  But class representatives 
generally do not have any unfettered right to access.53  In a standard 
attorney-client representation, the client has the absolute right to fire her 
lawyer for any reason at any time; the only qualification is that, if litigation 
has been filed, the client’s discharge of counsel is subject to court 
approval.54 But a class representative has no right to “replace class counsel 
at will.”55 In the typical lawyer-client relationship, the client and lawyer 
privately negotiate a fee, subject to only extremely loose regulation under 
disciplinary rules.56  In a class action, the court sets class counsel’s fee.57 
                                                 
50 Class counsel have been called “clientless” lawyers to capture the idea that the lawyer 
does not take direction from anyone – neither from an individual client nor from a legally 
authorized representative of a client.   See Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 
Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. 109-14 (2005), at 32 (stating the class actions “often 
involve numerous plaintiffs, each of whom has only a small financial stake in the litigation. 
As a result, few (if any) plaintiffs closely monitor the progress of the case or settlement 
negotiations, and these cases become ‘clientless litigation’”); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless”	
Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 111 (2017) (“[T]he lawyer, rather than the client, has to make 
the critical decisions in ‘clientless’ litigation.”).  See	generally Cooper, supra note 23, at 27 
(”A familiar concern is that class counsel in fact are the class”); Coffee, supra note 4, at 384 
(“the class representative is usually a token figure, with the class counsel being the real 
party in interest.”). 
51 Hayes v. Harmony Gold Min. Co., 509 F. App’x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2013). Accord In re Ivan 
F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1366 (2d Cir. 1991); In re FedEx Ground Package 
Systems, Inc. Employment Practices Litig., 2017 WL 632119, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 2017); 5 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][ii]. In one case, a court approved a 
settlement despite objections from ten out of the eleven class representatives. See Parker 
v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1982). 
52 See Rules 1.2(a) & 1.8(g), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See	also Kincade 
v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the ordinary 
rule that an attorney cannot settle without approval of the client is “simply inapplicable . . 
. [b]ecause of the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship in a class action”).  
53 See Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 400 (2009). 
54 See Rule 1.16(a)(3) and (c), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
55 Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995). See	
also 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 23:120[2][c][i]. 
56 See Rule 1.5(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall not make 
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee.”). 
57 See Rule 23(h), Fed. R. Civ. P. See	also Alexandra D. Lahav, Two	Views	of	 the	Class	
Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1943 (2011) (“The law does not allow class members to 
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Unlike in an ordinary representation, class counsel is not obligated, or even 
permitted, to loyally and competently pursue the individual class 
representative’s interests as distinct from those of the class members 
collectively.58  Rather, the lawyer is responsible to do what is in the class’s 
best interest, which may at times be contrary to the named plaintiffs’ 
preferences.   
 
Absent class members’ relationship with class counsel is even less 
like a lawyer-client relationship.  Clients ordinarily decide whether or not 
to sue.  But class counsel initiates class actions and seeks certification 
without the knowledge or approval of absent class members.  Many will 
never have any communication with counsel, or even know the litigation 
exists, until receiving an opt-out notice or settlement notice.  Like class 
representatives, absent class members lack standard client rights like the 
ability to veto a settlement. The commentary to the Model Rules recognizes 
that because “unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered 
to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying” the conflict-of-interest 
rule,59 class counsel may sue an absent class member in an unrelated 
matter.60  Federal courts and commentary on class action practice agree.61 
 
The notion that class counsel’s primary duty is to an abstract-
sounding entity—the class “as a whole”—rather than to individuals, has led 
some commentators to look for analogies. Many compare the class to a 
single entity like a corporation.62  But class counsel’s role differs from that 
of a corporation’s lawyer.63  Corporate lawyers take direction from duly 
authorized corporate officers,64 whereas class counsel makes decisions for 
                                                 
choose their attorney, to fire her, or to determine her compensation.”). 
58 See,	e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir. 
1990); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1982). 
59 Comment 25 to Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
60 Id. 
61 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:2 (“[C]ourts and commentators have held that absent 
class members, even after class certification, are not clients for some conflicts purposes, 
meaning that class counsel may be adverse to absent class members in other matters 
unrelated to the class action.”). 
62 See,	e.g., David L. Shapiro, Class	Actions:	The	Class	as	Party	and	Client, 73 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 913, 917 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling	Class	Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
699, 704 (2013); Lahav, supra note 57, at 1946. 
63 See,	e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Who	Should	Regulate	Class	Action	Lawyers?, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 577, 578 (2012); Moore, supra note 4, at 1482-89. 
64 See	generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 
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the class.  Likewise, class counsel’s role differs from that of a lawyer 
representing a fiduciary such as an administrator of an estate, a court-
appointed guardian, or a trustee.65  A fiduciary’s lawyer takes directions 
from the fiduciary.66  The lawyer owes obligations derivatively to the 
beneficiary in some circumstances,67 and may have some responsibility to 
protect the beneficiary from the fiduciary’s overreaching, but the fiduciary 
as client still has a wide range of discretion in making decisions regarding 
the representation.  In contrast, in a class action, the lawyer, not the class 
representative, makes decisions on behalf of the class.  Consequently, a 
lawyer who represented only the class could not properly endeavor to 
serve the interests of a class representative at the class’s expense. 
 
B.		The	Standard	View	of	Handling	Conflicts	in	Class	Action	Practice	
	
Case law and leading commentary reflect a standard four-part 
approach to conflicts in class actions.  Although courts and commentators 
only rarely acknowledge the conflict we address here, the federal judiciary 
and leading commentators probably assume that this approach sufficiently 
addresses all of class counsel’s conflicts, including any conflict in jointly 
representing a class and a class representative as an individual. 
 
First, to the extent that applying ethics rules would appear to make 
class actions less useful or more complex, courts often state that traditional 
conflicts rules should be relaxed or ignored.68  Second, as noted, in resolving 
                                                 
(1985) (“As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation 
cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when 
disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by 
individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.”); Rule 1.13(a), ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”). 
65 Some commentators have pressed the trustee analogy. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & 
Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding	Death	by	a	Thousand	Cuts:	The	Relitigation	of	Class	Certification	
and	the	Realities	of	the	Modern	Class	Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1662 (2014); Sergio J. 
Campos, Class	Actions	&	Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565 (2014). 
66 Cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5021 (“[O]nly the person or entity acting as a fiduciary is 
considered a client of the lawyer.”); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 94–380 (1994) (“The majority of jurisdictions consider that a lawyer who represents 
a fiduciary does not also represent the beneficiaries, and we understand the Model Rules 
to reflect this majority view.”). 
67 See,	e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1969) (“An attorney who negligently 
fails to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs liability in tort for violating a duty of 
care owed directly to the intended beneficiaries.”). 
68 See,	e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
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conflicts issues, courts prefer the class “as a whole” over the individual.69  
 
Third, the district court must act as a “fiduciary” for absent class 
members to protect their best interests.70 As the Federal Judicial Center has 
said, “Unlike other civil litigation, many class action suits do not involve a 
client who chooses a lawyer, negotiates the terms of the engagement, and 
monitor’s the lawyer’s performance. Those tasks, by default, fall to the 
judge.”71 The notion of a judge as a fiduciary protecting the interests of one 
side of a contested litigation is, of course, inconsistent with the standard 
view of our adversary system.72 
                                                 
courts do not apply disqualification rules automatically in class actions, because automatic 
disqualification “would have a serious adverse effect on class actions”); In re Agent Orange 
Prods. Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) (reviewing ordinary ethics rules and 
suggesting that “[c]lass action litigation presents additional problems that must be 
considered in determining whether or not to disqualify an attorney”); Bash v. Firstmark 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Recognizing that strict 
application of rules on attorney conduct that were designed with simpler litigation in mind 
might make the class-action device unworkable in many cases, the courts insist that a 
serious conflict be shown before they will take remedial or disciplinary action.”); In re Corn 
Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring) 
(stating that the “traditional” lawyer ethics “model cannot be carried over unmodified to 
the class action arena”); 6 NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 19:25 (“If the normal rule requiring 
disqualification applied, class actions would be nearly impossible to pursue, and hence the 
values served by such suits would be compromised.”).  Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 
89, 101-03 (1981) (overturning district court order barring solicitation or other 
communications by putative class counsel with class members on the ground that it 
interfered with Rule 23 goals for class actions).  
69 See supra notes 39, 44, 47 and accompanying text.  
70 See,	e.g., Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 
814 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 
563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 
2010); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir. 1981); In re 
Wireless Tel. Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005); In re 
Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D. Mass. 2004); Ray v. 
Mechel Bluestone, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-03014, 2018 WL 1309731, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 
2018); Jackson v. Innovative Sec. Servs., LLC, 283 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); 4 NEWBERG, 
supra note 1, § 13:40. 
71 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.27 at 278 (2004). 
72 A fiduciary must act in the best interests of the client or beneficiary. See,	e.g., BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 523 (7th ed.1999) (“fiduciary duty” defined in part as “a duty to act with 
the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests 
of the other person”). But it violates the Due Process Clause for a judge to be actually biased 
or appear to be biased in favor of one party over another. See,	e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
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Fourth and finally, courts emphasize that class counsel has a duty to 
inform the court of any “potential” conflicts so they can be aired and, if 
necessary, resolved by court action.73 The Federal Judicial Center, for 
example, states that class counsel must disclose to the court “any facet [of a 
proposed settlement] that may adversely affect any member of the class or 
may result in unequal treatment of class members.”74 This, of course, stands 
in some tension with an attorney’s ordinary duty to preserve client 
confidences.75   
Undue confidence in this approach may have led the judiciary and 
most commentators to ignore the pervasive conflict we address here, which 
occurs when class counsel has an individual lawyer-client relationship with 
a class representative.  
II. CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN REPRESENTING CLASS 
REPRESENTATIVES  
  
 A lawyer’s concurrent or joint representation of a class and an 
individual class representative in connection with a class action lawsuit 
entails at least the possibility of a conflict of interest, as would a litigator’s 
joint representation of spouses, of a corporation and its principal, or of any 
other co-clients.  But there is nothing to suggest that lawyers for the class 
identify this as a conflict-of-interest problem commanding analysis under 
the conflict rules, which call initially for deciding whether the 
representation of one client is significantly likely to be limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another.76  And there is certainly nothing in the 
professional literature to suggest that lawyers sever their relationships 
                                                 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009). 
73 See,	e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1167 
(9th Cir. 2013); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 103-04 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Agent	Orange, 800 F.2d at 18; Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 
1176 (5th Cir. 1978); National Ass’n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 
340, 346 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 
cmt. d(iii).  
74 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.641 at 324 (2004). 
75 See Rule 1.6(a), Model Rules of Professional Conduct (deeming confidential 
“information relating to the representation”). We are not contending that class counsel 
violates this Rule. Arguably disclosures of the type discussed in the main text are “impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation.” Id. 
76 ABA Model Rule 1.7. 
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with the individual class members after filing a class action, or that lawyers 
are expected to do so.   
 
Further, there are various reasons why, if allowed to do so, lawyers 
would prefer to maintain the original individual lawyer-client relationships 
after filing a class action lawsuit.  For example: (1) A promise to maintain 
the individual client relationship even after class certification may help 
induce the client to hire the lawyer in the first place. (2) If the class action 
is not certified, the lawyer may want to return to representing the clients in 
pursuing individual claims, particularly when individual claims have 
significant monetary value.  (3) Preserving the individual relationship may 
facilitate the receipt of fees for work relating to the individual 
representation before the class action was filed.  (4) Preserving the 
irelationship may (for better or worse) help maintain a good relationship 
with the class representative in acting as a fiduciary for the benefit of the 
class.  Class counsel might desire this because it would be in the class’s best 
interest or, alternately, because class counsel, seeking to maximize their 
private interests, desire less oversight by class representatives.  (5) Class 
counsel may perceive it to be disloyal or disadvantageous to the client to 
terminate the original, individual representation upon appointment as 
class counsel.  
 
 The concurrent representation of a class (or putative class) and an 
individual serving (or proposing to serve) as class representative would not 
be problematic if the individual client’s interests were always perfectly 
aligned with those of the class throughout the lawsuit.  But their interests 
may in fact diverge, because the class representative’s interest in obtaining 
the most favorable outcome individually may differ from the class’s interest 
in obtaining the best outcome for the class members collectively, and the 
class representative may have opportunities to further its individual self-
interest at the class’s expense.   
 
 Divergence of interests between class representatives and the class 
as a whole could in theory be present in any class action. But in practice, the 
prevalence and strength of divergence will likely often vary with factors 
such as the nature of the injury, the nature of the legal claim, and the type 
of relief sought. For example, a cause of action with a statutory damages 
cap77 will provide different incentives for plaintiffs than one without.  
                                                 
77 See,	e.g., Geismann v. ZocDoc Inc., 850 F.3d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing a class 
action with claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, which 
contains damages caps). 
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Plaintiffs in mass tort class actions involving serious injuries or death likely 
have very strong interests “in individually controlling the prosecution” of 
his or her case,78 stronger than those of plaintiffs with, for example, very 
low-stakes consumer law claims.79 Keeping in mind the diversity of factors 
that may influence plaintiffs’ incentives and decisionmaking in the class 
action context, we review three scenarios in which divergences of interest 
between class representatives and absent class members are likely to arise.  
 
A.		Holdouts	
 
Even though a class representative’s claims must be “typical” of 
those asserted by the class,80 that representative’s personal interests may 
differ from those of class members in ways that may make a settlement 
more or less advantageous for the individual.81  For instance, a class 
representative might have a greater or less appetite for litigation risk than 
the average class member, or a different preferred time horizon for 
realizing the expected financial or other gains of the litigation.  The class 
representative may simply disagree with class counsel or other class 
members about the advisability of a proposed settlement. 82   In any of these 
cases, the class may benefit from a settlement that the class representative 
opposes.83  
                                                 
78 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616 (involving claims arising from asbestos exposure). 
79 See,	e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that “in 
consumer class actions . . . the percentage of class members who file claims is often quite 
low,” well below one percent). 
80 Rule 23(a)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. 
81 Jay Tidmarsh addressed this possibility in an article discussing why particular class 
members may not be adequate representatives of the class.  Tidmarsh, supra note 17. See	
generally Miller, supra note 11, at 622 (“It is often the case that the proposed 
representative plaintiff has features that differ from the class as a whole which may place 
this individual in some degree of tension or conflict with other class members.”). 
82 See,	e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 27, 30 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (reviewing objections to settlement by one named representative). 
83 Of course, a dispute between class counsel and class representatives may also reflect 
that class counsel is acting self-interestedly, to the class’s detriment.  Courts and 
commentators recognize that class counsel may have systematically different preferences 
about settlement than class members. See,	e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 
(7th Cir. 2014); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  For 
example, class counsel have incentives to settle quickly, before investing too many 
resources in litigation, in a way that often cuts against the interests of the class. 	See,	e.g., 
Alon Klement, Who	 Should	Guard	 the	Guardians?	A	New	Approach	 for	Monitoring	Class	
Action	Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 38–40 (2002); Coffee, supra note 4, at 390-91; Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Contingent	Fees	and	Class	Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 358 (1998). 
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There is obviously a conflict of interest if the class representative 
holds out against a settlement that class counsel believes to be in the class’s 
best interest: in a fairness hearing,84 the lawyer cannot simultaneously 
advocate for the settlement on behalf of the class while opposing it on 
behalf of the individual client.85  At that point, under a traditional Model 
Rules approach, the lawyer would have to withdraw from representing the 
class, the individual client, or both.86  In class actions, courts rarely require 
a conflicted class counsel to withdraw entirely from all representations.  
For example, in the “Agent Orange” class action, two of the class counsel 
who served on the plaintiffs’ management committee were permitted to 
stop representing the class but to continue representing individual clients 
in their objections to a settlement.87  In light of the benefit of having the 
objections put forth by lawyers who were familiar with the litigation, the 
court declined to apply traditional conflict-of-interest principles, which 
would likely have precluded the lawyers from acting adversely to the class, 
which they had previously represented in the same matter.88   
 
Conversely, in Lazy	 Oil	 Co.	 v.	 Witco	 Corp.,89 the Third Circuit 
permitted class counsel to advocate for a settlement on behalf of the class 
                                                 
84 See Rule 23(e)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. 
85 See,	e.g., Flores v. Mamma Lombardi’s of Holbrook, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 18, 2015) (“That Mr. Romero negotiated a settlement on behalf of the class, then 
helped draft objections to that settlement on behalf of certain class members and, finally, 
reversed positions again to argue against those objections is most troubling. Worse yet, . . 
. Mr. Romero has the unbridled temerity to bill for hours spent consulting on objections to 
the very settlement he negotiated on behalf of the class.”). 
86 See,	e.g., Rule 1.7, cmt. 4, ABA Model Rules (“If a conflict arises after representation 
has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, 
unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client . . . Where more than one 
client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is 
determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client 
and by the lawyer’s ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given 
the lawyer’s duties to the former client.”); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal 
Op. 2005-05 (“[W]hen two clients will not consent to a conflict of interest, and the conflict 
requires consent, the law firm must withdraw from representation of at least one of the 
clients.”). 
87 In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986). 
88 Id. at 18-19.  Similarly, in In	re	Corn	Derivatives	Antitrust	Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 
1984), the court permitted class counsel to withdraw from representing the class while 
continuing to represent former class representatives who opposed a settlement. 
89 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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over the opposition of class representatives who were former clients.90  The 
Lazy	Oil court did not comment on the problem that gave rise to the conflict 
of interest in the first place: the lawyers’ concurrent representation of the 
class and class representatives.  The court addressed only whether the 
lawyer, having withdrawn from representing the objecting individual 
client, could represent the class against the objector.  The court may have 
assumed that this problem could have arisen whether or not the lawyer had 
jointly represented the class and the individual: the objector would have 
been a former client even if the lawyer had ended the individual 
representation as soon as the class was certified. 
 
The courts in Lazy	Oil and cases like it overlook how class counsel’s 
conflict may have affected the representation before the lawyer chose sides.  
Suppose, for example, that the individual client in Lazy	Oil was uncertain 
whether to support the proposed settlement and asked for the lawyer’s 
advice.  If the settlement was in fact disadvantageous to the individual 
client, the lawyer could not so advise without being disloyal to the class and 
prejudicing its interests.  And, having concluded that the class would benefit 
from the settlement, the lawyer might not recognize that the individual 
client should opt out, and perhaps even oppose, the settlement.  At that 
point, class counsel could not give disinterested advice to the individual.   
 
Or suppose that class counsel had not yet decided whether to 
advocate for a possible settlement, and the individual client strongly 
opposed the settlement or would be better off without it.  At that point, the 
lawyer could not make a disinterested judgment on behalf of the class.  If 
the lawyer represented the class alone, the lawyer would be required to 
consider class representatives’ views but not necessarily defer to them.  If 
class representatives are also individual clients, however, the duties of 
loyalty and competence would require the lawyer to seek to carry out their 
objectives.  In the “Agent Orange” class action, where multiple class counsel 
represented individual claimants with different views, the conflict may not 
have prejudiced the class.  But in a case where a single class counsel owes 
allegiance to a lead plaintiff who is also an individual client, and who 
opposes a possible settlement, the lawyer may ultimately decline to 
advance the settlement, to the class’s detriment, out of loyalty to the 
                                                 
90 Id. at 590 (permitting the representation “as long as the interest of the class in 
continued representation by experienced counsel is not outweighed by the actual 
prejudice to the objectors of being opposed by their former counsel”).  Although class 
counsel may seek court approval for a settlement even if the representative plaintiff 
disagrees, the representative plaintiff’s objection cause the court to scrutinize a proposed 
settlement more closely.   
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individual.  Class counsel may be influenced unconsciously as well as 
consciously: they may not realize that their assessment of the proposed 
settlement is influenced by their concern for the class representative’s 
personal interests or preferences.   
	
B.		Sellouts	
 
Another conflict may arise when the class representative proposes 
to settle the individual claim on its own.  Nothing in the law forecloses the 
putative class representative from settling separately with the defendant 
and, if there are no other class representatives, dismissing the class action 
lawsuit.91  Individual claims of a representative of a certified class may also 
be settled, with the class action remaining in hiatus while a new class 
representative is sought.  The individual settlement may be a legitimate 
response to uncertainties about the viability of a class action.92  In many 
cases, although the individual will be acting self-interestedly, the absent 
class members will not be disadvantaged, either because they are 
uninterested in filing individual or class claims,93 or because they will not 
                                                 
91 See,	e.g., Mars Steel v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit begun as a class action may often and quite properly be settled as an 
individual action, that is, without preclusive effect on other members of the class”). Cf. 
Kulig v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 13-Civ.-4715, 2014 WL 5017817, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
26, 2014) (stating that putative class counsel acted unethically by not communicating a 
proposed settlement offer to individual clients who were seeking to be class 
representatives); Victorino v. FCA US LLC, 322 F.R.D. 403, 407-08 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (same); 
Robert Alan Ins. Agency v. Girard Bank, 107 F.R.D. 271, (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“[It is not ‘improper 
for a potential class representative on his behalf to attempt, before filing suit, to negotiate 
a settlement for himself.’”). Prior to 2003 amendments, some courts interpreted Rule 23 
to require court approval before a putative class representative could settle individually. 
It is now clear that that is not required. See Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments 
to Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.  If a court sees evidence that putative class representatives are 
using the class allegations to try to extract individual settlements, the court may make 
appropriate orders to protect against “an unintended use of the class action device.” 
Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music, 586 F.2d 962, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1978).   
92 Cf. Mars	Steel, 834 F.2d at 680 (“Settlement negotiations are made more complicated 
when the parties don’t know whether they are trying to settle a class action or an action 
limited to the named plaintiffs, don't know whether the named plaintiffs would be deemed 
adequate representatives of the class if the case proceeded to trial, and don’t know the 
composition and size of the class.”). 
93 See,	e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions create the opportunity for a 
kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a 
large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess 
of the individual claims’ actual worth.”).   
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be prejudiced from now doing so.94  But in other cases, the class 
representative may be essentially selling out the class,95 using the class 
action for its individual benefit and to the detriment of absent class 
members, who may find it harder to advance their claims because of the 
passage of time, difficulty locating someone else willing to undertake the 
burden of being a class representative, or strategic decisions made by 
putative class counsel before abandoning the lawsuit.96  
 
If the individual client expresses an interest in pursuing its financial 
self-interest by negotiating an individual settlement, the lawyer who jointly 
represents the individual and the class has a conflict of interest.  
Presumably it is precisely because a defendant thinks that it will prejudice 
the class or putative class that that defendant is seeking to settle a class 
representative’s individual claim.  The defendant would likely not be willing 
to settle with the individual if the class action would continue 
uninterrupted with the quick substitution of another party that would serve 
equally well as lead plaintiff.  But if a settlement is in the individual client’s 
interest, the lawyer cannot pursue it or encourage it without thereby 
betraying the class.  Conversely, if class counsel promotes the best interests 
of the class as a whole—as courts and commentators suggest—the lawyer 
will betray the individual client by discouraging or impeding the individual 
settlement.  Even if the lawyer honestly believes that the settlement is not 
in the individual’s interest, the lawyer cannot be certain that this 
assessment is objective, unaffected by the interests of the class.  The conflict 
makes it ethically perilous to advise the individual client what to do or to 
                                                 
94 Individual settlement should not affect class claims as a formal legal matter. See	
generally Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 593 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who 
files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the 
class is certified.”); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) (“Neither a proposed 
class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.”). An individual settlement 
does not have a preclusive effect on class claims, see	Mars	Steel, 834 F.2d at 681, and tolling 
should generally be available to extend the statutes of limitations on class claims, see,	e.g., 
In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 256 (2d Cir. 2007).  
95 See,	e.g., Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670, 671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978) (accusing 
the putative class representative and class counsel of attempting to sell out the class to 
leverage a higher individual settlement).  
96 See	generally Robert D. Phillips, Jr. & Samuel J. Park, Ethical	 Issues	 in	Class	Action	
Settlements, in 1 MARCY HOGAN GREER ED., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 941, 967 
(2017) (stating that “settling a putative class action on an individual basis with the named 
plaintiffs” is a “tactical” approach that “often makes sense from a defense perspective, as 
settling with the named plaintiffs is less costly than settling with the entire class and doing 
so may derail the class action”). 
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negotiate with the defendant on the individual’s behalf.   
 
Even if the plaintiff does not initiate an individual settlement, a 
defendant may seek to “pick off” the named plaintiff by offering an 
individual settlement, perhaps for as much or more than the full amount 
claimed.97  If the class member is primarily driven by financial self-interest, 
the proposed settlement will be attractive: the party’s claim will be fully 
satisfied without further delay and the party avoids the further time and 
expense of representing the class.   Presumably, class counsel previously 
explained the role of class representative and sought some assurance that 
the client would stay the course, but nothing binds the client to earlier 
assurances.  At that point, the client might turn to class counsel for advice 
whether to accept the offer or continue to serve in the fiduciary role as 
named plaintiff.   Again, this creates a conflict from the perspective of both 
clients – the class member and the class.  From the named plaintiff’s 
perspective, there is a risk that the lawyer will not render disinterested 
advice: out of loyalty to the class, the lawyer may discourage a settlement 
that is in the client’s best interest.  From the class’s perspective, the risk is 
that the lawyer will act disloyally: the lawyer may encourage the individual 
client to accept the offer when doing so would harm the class.   
 
As this example reflects, the conflict may be outside class counsel’s 
control and unavoidable: even if the class representative is initially 
disinclined to act opportunistically, once the defendant makes a settlement 
offer to the class representative individually, the lawyer must convey it.98  
Ordinarily, the lawyer must also advise the class representative about the 
offer’s relative merits.  The lawyer cannot simply convey the offer and say 
nothing further, depriving the client of advice altogether.99  But the lawyer 
also cannot give disinterested advice.   
 
Any response to the conflict now is costly.  First, the lawyer might 
seek the court’s permission to withdraw from representing the class.  If the 
                                                 
97 See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016); Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6627 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016). 
98 See cases cited in supra note 91. 
99 See Rule 1.1, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.”); id. Rule 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall 
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. . .  . A lawyer shall 
abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. Rule 1.4(a) (“A lawyer shall: 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the 
client's informed consent . . . is required by these Rules.”). 
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court approves, co-counsel from other law firms, if available, may pick up 
the slack.  If none are available, the lawyer’s withdrawal would impede, if 
not entirely derail, the class action lawsuit. This may harm the individual as 
well as the class, since an individual settlement might collapse.  Further, if 
the lawyer must withdraw before advising the individual client and 
commencing negotiations, the individual may lose the leverage that the 
class action afforded.   
 
Second, the lawyer might stop representing the class representative 
individually.  But the individual client might then feel betrayed and be 
disadvantaged by having to retain a new lawyer who is unfamiliar with the 
case and with whom the individual has no prior relationship.  The ability to 
conclude a favorable individual settlement may be impeded by the delay, 
while the new lawyer takes time learning the relevant facts.  And the time 
and expense may prove to be for naught if no individual deal is made.   
 
Third, class counsel might limit the scope of the representation of 
the individual class representative by carving out assistance regarding a 
possible settlement.100  Class representatives in this scenario might be 
required either to negotiate with the defendant on their own or to retain or 
rely on other lawyers to assist them.  Institutional clients, for example, 
might employ in-house counsel or other outside counsel with whom they 
already have a relationship.  In that event, however, the client would lose 
the benefit of the lawyer who is most familiar with the lawsuit and who may 
have had sustained dealings with opposing counsel.   
 
Finally, class counsel might attempt to limit the scope of the 
representation of the class, so that, in negotiating on behalf of the 
individual, the lawyer will owe no loyalty duty to the class.  This is, of 
course, another way of saying that the lawyer will be free to be disloyal to 
the class and to serve the individual’s interests at the class’s expense.  One 
might justify this limitation on the theory that, as a legal abstraction, the 
class will not perceive that it is being betrayed and its trust in the lawyer 
will not diminish as a consequence.  But the class may suffer concretely as 
well.  For example, by forgoing counsel’s loyalty during negotiations with 
the defendant, the class may be giving up the opportunity to negotiate a 
favorable class settlement.  Needless to say, a lawyer could not unilaterally 
limit the representation of the class. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
                                                 
100 See Rule 1.2(c), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer may limit the 
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the 
client gives informed consent.”). 
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would seem to prohibit this approach.101 But possibly a lawyer might seek 
a court’s authorization to proceed in this manner.    
 
This conflict between the named representative’s interest in 
negotiating an individual settlement and the class’s interests arguably 
exists even if neither the defendant nor the class representative proposes 
such a settlement, at any point in the representation when an individual 
settlement is a plausible option that the individual might be open to 
pursuing.  A lawyer has a duty to discuss the possibility of settlement with 
a client in a lawsuit.102  Even if the client at the outset had no interest in 
pursuing an individual settlement, under the Model Rules approach the 
lawyer could not make it a condition of the retention that the client would 
not have a change of heart, any more than a criminal defense lawyer can 
demand that the accused promise not to plead guilty: the decision whether 
to settle a dispute belongs irrevocably to the client.103  Retainer agreements 
suggest, however, that some lawyers try to bar clients who become putative 
class representatives from settling individually.104 Other retainer 
agreements require putative class representatives to agree to be dropped 
as clients if a conflict arises with another client105—a clause that might be 
invoked if the client wanted to accept an individual settlement over the 
objection of the class counsel.  Notwithstanding these attempts to contract 
around the rules, a lawyer for individual class members may have an 
obligation to raise the possibility of an individual settlement.  At each such 
point, if the lawyer also represents the class, the lawyer will have a conflict 
of interest. 
                                                 
101 See Rule 23(g)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class.) 
102 Cf. Rule 1.4. comment 2, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“[A] lawyer who 
receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy . . . must 
promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that 
the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or 
to reject the offer.”). 
103 See Rule 1.2(a), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
104 See,	e.g., Retainer Agreement—Class Action, ECF No. 84-2, BABB	Real	Estate	LLC	v.	
Bennett,	Shelaine, No. 3:10-cv-00119 (W.D. Wisc.) (“Client understands that it cannot settle 
a class action lawsuit without protecting the interests of the other class members.”). 
105 See, e.g., Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson, ECF No. 16-1, 
Anderson	v.	PODS	of	Los	Angeles,	LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal.) (“You understand that 
Attorney will not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create 
a conflict with one of the Attorney’s existing clients . . . . You expressly agree to immediately 
consent to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if 
Attorney learns through discovery of such a conflict.”).   
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C.		Payouts	
 
The possibility of payouts is a third recurring situation where 
conflicts arise between the interests of the class and a class representative 
who also has an individual attorney-client relationship with class counsel.  
With some frequency, class representatives seek or are promised by 
counsel a unique amount of monetary compensation, greater than what 
other class members will receive, often in conflict with the class’s 
interests.106  So-called “incentive awards” to class representatives are 
common,107 and are typically determined following a settlement.108  There 
is nothing inherently wrong with such payouts when they are negotiated 
after settlement—except in securities class actions where a statute has 
altered the law.109  But the case reports are full of examples of class 
representatives and class counsel negotiating an individual windfall payout 
to the representative before a settlement is approved, sometimes as a 
condition of the class representative supporting the settlement.   
 
The most abusive form of these deals involves significant benefits to 
both class representatives and class counsel, and little or nothing of value 
for the class.  In one case, a disability discrimination class action was settled 
against the owner of gasoline service stations with a $5,000 payment to the 
named plaintiff, $50,000 in attorney’s fees, injunctive relief that simply 
required the corporation to “meet its legal obligations (or perhaps even less 
than that required) under the [Americans with Disabilities Act],” and a very 
broad release of the absent class members’ statutory damages claims.110 
Another example is a settlement of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class 
                                                 
106 See,	e.g., Fleury v. Richemont North America, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, *10 n.5 (N.D. 
Cal. July 3, 2008). 
107 Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Such awards 
are discretionary, . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done 
on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing 
the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney 
general.”); see	generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive	Awards	to	Class	
Action	Plaintiffs:	An	Empirical	Study, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1303 (2006). 
108 See Rodriguez., 563 F.3d at 959.   
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (requiring a putative lead plaintiff in a securities 
class action to file with the court a sworn certification that “the plaintiff will not accept any 
payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff’s pro 
rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court”). 
110 Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 942, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2003) (subsequent history 
omitted).  
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suit that provided for $2,000 to the named plaintiff, a small donation to a 
law school clinic, $78,000 in attorney’s fees, and a release that left absent 
class members able to bring their own individual damages suits but not a 
subsequent class action.111  Both settlements were approved by district 
court judges but reversed on appeal as unfair to the classes.  
 
Defendants are happy to make deals like this, if they can secure 
approval of class counsel and the courts.  The ready possibility of securing 
deals that sell out the absent class members to benefit the class 
representative and class counsel puts class counsel in an inherently 
conflicted position.  District and appellate courts do reject some of these 
settlements as unfair to the class.  As a result, a lawyer for the class and class 
representative individually might argue that he or she has no duty to 
counsel the individual client about the possibility of a deal, and therefore 
no conflict between duties to the class and the class representative 
individually.  In our view, however, because not all of these deals are 
rejected, the conflict remains. 
 
To see why, consider the case of incentive payments to class 
representatives, negotiated prior to settlement, with the settlement also 
giving real benefits to the absent class members. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit recently considered a settlement in Fair Credit Reporting Act case 
against credit rating agencies which issued credit reports that continued to 
list debts as delinquent that had been discharged in bankruptcy.112  Absent 
class members received some value from the settlement. An injunction 
required the three defendants, which dominate the credit reporting market, 
to “presume the discharge of certain pre-bankruptcy debts” going 
forward.113 Class members who could prove that a negative credit report 
contributed to denial of employment got $750; denials of a mortgage or 
housing rental paid $500; and denials of consumer credit or auto loans paid 
$150.  Class members who could not prove actual damages received about 
$26 as “convenience awards.”114  Class representatives, however, were 
promised $5,000 each—far more than absent class members—on the 
express condition that they support the settlement.115 
                                                 
111 Crawford v. Equifax Payment Services, Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 800 (7th Cir. 2000). 
112 See Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
113 Id. at 1162.  
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 1164-65. 
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This was a conflict from both the individual client’s perspective and 
the class’s perspective.  The lawyer could not negotiate on behalf of both 
the individual class member and the class.  Helping the class 
representatives to a better deal hurt the class, by depriving it of the class 
representatives’ fiduciary role in protecting absent class members, and by 
directing money away from absent class members into the pockets of the 
representatives.  It is considered axiomatic in the class action literature that 
defendants care only about the total dollar value of a settlement, but not 
about how the dollars are divided between class counsel, class 
representatives, and absent class members.116 Choices by class 
representatives and class counsel about allocating settlement money are 
zero-sum and hence necessarily put counsel in a conflicted position when 
counsel owes duties simultaneously to the class and the class 
representatives.  
 
III. WHEN DOES CLASS COUNSEL’S CONFLICT OF INTEREST FIRST BEGIN? 
 
 As described in Part II, lawyers who jointly represent a class and its 
individual class representative will have a conflict of interest at least at the 
point when the class representative opposes a favorable settlement of the 
class action, seeks a favorable individual settlement that will prejudice 
absent class members, or seeks an incentive payment or other individual 
benefit from the settlement of the class action that exceeds the benefits 
afforded to absent class members.  At these moments, the conflicting 
interests of the class and the individual client make it difficult or impossible 
for the lawyer to serve both clients competently and loyally.  One might say 
that the lawyer’s conflict of interest is now manifest, patent, real or 
actual.117  
 
One question this raises is, when should lawyers in class actions first 
address the problem of their clients’ differing interests?  May lawyers wait 
to see whether the conflict becomes manifest, as may occur in only a 
fraction of class actions, or does the risk of a manifest conflict of interest 
require the court and lawyer to address the problem at the certification 
stage, or even earlier?  This is an important question that judicial decisions 
                                                 
116 See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“The 
defendant cares only about the size of the settlement, not how it is divided between 
attorneys’ fees and compensation for the class.”).  
117 These are all terms used to convey that the problem actually now exists – it is not 
conjectural or in the future.   
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and other writings overlook, with the result that lawyers have been free to 
ignore conflicts of interest until they compromise the representation (and, 
in some cases, even then).118  Once litigation is well advanced, lawyers, 
courts, and clients often feel significant pressure to stay the course, even if 
the conflict is a serious one.  This part addresses these questions of timing 
from the perspective of two points in time.   
 
Part A focuses on the class certification stage.  It discusses how 
professional conduct rules governing conflicts of interest deal with what 
might be described as “nascent conflicts” or potential conflicts among joint 
clients – that is, the situation early in the representation when the joint 
clients’ conflicting interests have not yet put the lawyer in a bind, but when 
a lawyer can nevertheless envision the possibility that a conflict may 
become manifest as the representation unfolds.119  Part B looks at the 
earlier moment in time when the lawyer files a class action complaint on 
behalf of a putative class representative whom the lawyer also represents 
individually.  It considers whether a lawyer filing a class action lawsuit must 
address the nascent conflict at the outset, even before the lawyer formally 
represents the class, because the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the nascent 
class give rise to a conflict of interest from the perspective of the individual 
client, the absent class members, or both.120  Although neither the absent 
class members nor the class itself are clients as a legal matter, and therefore 
the lawyer is not engaged in a joint representation of clients with conflicting 
interests, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule 
23, among others, hold that, after filing a class action, the lawyer owes 
duties to the absent class members or to the nascent or putative class.121  If 
so, the lawyer’s representation of the individual may be compromised by 
                                                 
118 Courts are more concerned with the lawyer’s self-interest than with the conflicting 
interests of the class and the class representatives.  See,	e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, 
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (“[I]t is a reality of class action life that the potential 
for such abuse lies chiefly in the hands of plaintiff's counsel who, as a negotiator, 
unfortunately must represent three distinct and inherently conflicting interests: the 
named plaintiff's, the asserted class members' and his own. . . .”).  
119 See,	e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Through	a	Glass	Darkly”:	How	the	Court	Sees	Motions	to	
Disqualify	Criminal	Defense	Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1212 (1989) (distinguishing 
“an actual or nascent conflict”).  More often, particularly in the criminal context, the 
literature distinguishes between “actual” and “potential” conflicts.  See,	 e.g., Mickens v. 
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 165 (2002). 
120 The term “nascent class” is used occasionally in the literature, see, for example, In re 
Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (D. Md. 1983), but the 
term “putative class” is used far more commonly to describe the class before it is certified.   
121 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
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the lawyer’s conflicting duties, if not by a conflicting representation, and the 
lawyer’s ability to act for the nascent class’s benefit may be compromised 
by the lawyer’s duties to the individual client. 
 
A.		Nascent	Conflicts:	The	Class	Certification	Stage	
 
Under the Model Rules, in the situations described in Part II, the 
lawyer would likely have a conflict of interest at the outset of the joint 
representation.  That is true even if no one anticipates that class 
representatives will necessary act in their own interest as distinct from 
those of the class.  Their interests differ now, and there is a risk that, later, 
the conflicting interests will have implications for the lawyer’s work.  
Conflict of interest rules regulate the risk that trouble will arise later, even 
if joint clients are harmonious at the start.   
 
The threshold question in representing joint clients, such as a class 
and a class representative, is whether there is a “significant risk” that the 
lawyer’s representation of one will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
duties to the other.122  This calls for the lawyer to make a prediction in light 
of the respective clients’ interests, the nature of the representation, and the 
lawyer’s experience, among other considerations.123  Further, this 
judgment must be made against the background of professional writing, 
including judicial decisions and bar association opinions, that have applied 
and given meaning to the conflict rule in the past.  A joint representation of 
parties to a lawsuit is frequently a conflict of interest, because the co-clients 
often have differing interests and, given the nature of litigation, the risk is 
often “significant” (as opposed to “insignificant”) that, at some point, as the 
litigation progresses, the lawyer’s duties to one will compromise the 
lawyer’s representation of the other.124   
 
If class counsel intends to represent class representatives 
                                                 
122 Rule 1.7(a)(2), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
123 See	generally Rule 1.7 cmt. 8, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“The mere 
possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical 
questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, 
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment 
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be 
pursued on behalf of the client.”).  
124 See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. On Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-7 (“Joint 
representation of multiple parties to a litigation . . . often involves a conflict of interest 
because there is a significant risk that the clients will differ as to, for example, litigation 
strategy or cooperation and resolution.”). 
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individually after the class is certified, the joint representation almost 
certainly will constitute a conflict.  There will be a “significant risk” that, at 
some later point, unless the lawyer withdraws from one of the 
representations or limits its scope, the lawyer’s duties to the class will 
compromise the lawyer’s representation of the class representative, or 
versa.125  The question is whether, under the conflict rules, the lawyer may 
undertake or continue the joint representation despite this risk.  The rules 
are somewhat paternalistic: they forbid the joint representation even with 
the respective clients’ informed consent unless lawyers reasonably believe 
that they can represent each client competently and diligently despite the 
conflict.126  But the authorities interpreting and applying the rules 
ordinarily allow joint clients whose interests are generally aligned to 
assume the risk that, down the road, there will be a parting of the ways.  In 
that event, the lawyer may represent both with the respective clients’ 
“informed consent.”127 
 
The takeaway is that lawyers jointly representing a class 
representative and the class cannot blithely ignore the risks until a conflict 
of interest manifests itself.  They must assess the likelihood that the class 
representatives will try to benefit at the class’s expense.  If that is the class 
representatives’ objective from the outset, the joint representation is likely 
improper, because the risk that the clients will be competing with each 
other will be too high.  In that event, the lawyer might seek to be appointed 
as class counsel but drop the individual client; or the lawyer might continue 
representing the individual and try to identify another lawyer to be 
appointed to serve as class counsel – but the lawyer cannot do both.  Case 
law suggests that class counsel in such a position is not supposed to make 
these decisions privately. Conflicts and potential conflicts must be called to 
the district court’s attention,128 and counsel must seek the court’s direction 
for how to resolve the conflict.  One reason is that the Rules’ requirement 
that each affected client give informed consent when joint representations 
involve conflicts of interest129 cannot practically be applied to absent class 
members, who can number in the thousands in many class actions.130  
                                                 
125 Cf. Stuhan & Costello, supra note 11, at 1200 (“[T]he stakes are typically too high [in 
class actions] . . . to wait until a conflict becomes manifest and obvious”).  
126 Rule 1.7(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
127 Rule 1.7(b)(4), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
128 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
129 Rule 1.7(b)(4), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; id. Rule 1.4(a) and (b). 
130 See	generally LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 465 (3d ed. 2012) (“It is not practicable to sit down with each member of a large class 
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B.		Nascent	Classes:	The	Beginning	of	the	Lawsuit	
 
Whether a lawyer who files a class action has a conflict of interest 
even before the class is certified is a difficult question because of the 
uncertainty regarding the lawyer’s duties (if any) to the nascent class.  Until 
the class is certified, the class does not exist as a legal entity, and therefore, 
the lawyer would seem to have only one client: the prospective class 
representative who is the plaintiff in the lawsuit.131  But it is conceivable 
that the lawyer nevertheless owes duties to absent class members, or to the 
nascent class, that limit the lawyer’s ordinary zeal on behalf of the 
individual. As noted, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23, and others, conclude that, after filing a class action 
and before class certification, the lawyer owes a duty to act in the best 
interest of the absent putative class members or to the nascent or putative 
class.132  Some courts have apparently gone further, stating that lawyers 
who file a class action lawsuit have fiduciary duties to the absent class 
members.133  But these decisions have not elaborated on the nature and 
extent of those duties or explained how a lawyer should address the tension 
between the individual client’s interests and conflicting duties to the 
                                                 
to explain possible conflicts and obtain meaningful informed consent.”); Cooper, supra 
note 23, at 39 (“Counsel for the class seldom is in a position to consult with each class 
member to determine individual interests and needs, or to measure and reconcile the 
conflicts among individual interests and needs.”). Class counsel must, however, explain the 
implications of the joint representation – the benefits, risks and alternatives – and secure 
the informed consent of class representatives who are also individual clients.   
131 Stuhan & Costello, supra	note 11, at 1205 & n.43(“[U]ntil a class is certified, there is 
no formal attorney-client relationship between the putative class and putative class 
counsel.”) (citing authority).   
132 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
133 See,	e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass attorneys, purporting to represent a class, also owe the entire 
class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed”); Fleury v. Richemont North 
America, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, *44 (N.D. Ca. July 3, 2008) (citing authority); see	
generally	 Nick Landsman-Roos, Note, Front‐End	 Fiduciaries:	 Precertification	Duties	 and	
Class	Conflict, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 838 (2013): “While there is agreement that counsel 
owes a fiduciary duty to a certified class, the existence of such a relationship in the 
precertification stage is far from clear. The majority view is that before class certification, 
the putative class members are not ‘represented’ by class counsel and thus are not owed a 
fiduciary duty. Yet a number of courts have held that, even in the absence of class 
certification, class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to unnamed class members in the 
precertification period. Regardless of the position taken, these decisions are largely bereft 
of reasoning.” 
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putative class.  In general, at the pre-certification stage, the conflict with 
which courts are concerned does not involve the competing interests of the 
class and class representatives but the risk that the lawyers will give 
primacy to their own legal fees.134 There is no definitive statement to be 
found about duties to a nascent class in either Rule 23, its case law, or the 
Model Rules.  
 
 That neither the nascent class nor the absent class members are a 
client at this stage does not mean that the lawyer cannot owe them duties 
once the class action is filed.  There is nothing anomalous about owing 
duties to a non-client.  Lawyers may assume a duty of competence to third 
parties for whom (in the course of representing a client) they prepare an 
opinion letter;135 they may also assume a competence duty to a client’s 
beneficiaries.136 Nor is it unprecedented for lawyers to owe duties to 
“nascent” clients.  Some authorities recognize, for example, that lawyers 
representing clients in forming a corporation may assume duties to the yet-
to-be-formed corporation.137  
 
 In these examples, however, the lawyer undertakes duties to third 
parties by express or implied agreement either with the lawyer’s client or 
with the third parties themselves.  When a lawyer assumes duties to an 
unformed corporation, it is because the lawyer has agreed to do so with the 
individual clients who retained the lawyer to establish the corporation.  
When a lawyer undertakes duties to a third party for whom the lawyer 
prepares an opinion letter, it is because the lawyer agreed with the third 
party to do so.  A third party is not necessarily entitled to rely on opinion 
letters prepared by lawyers exclusively for the lawyers’ clients.138  But if the 
lawyer agrees to provide an opinion to a prospective buyer or agrees that 
                                                 
134 See,	e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429, 439 
(D.N.J. 2000). 
135 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2). 
136 Id. § 51(3). 
137 See,	e.g., Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992) (where lawyer represents 
a person for the purpose of incorporating an entity, following the incorporation the 
lawyer’s earlier representation will be “deemed to be representation of the entity, not the 
person”); State Bar of Az., Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002) (“[A] lawyer may represent an entity 
during the formation process, as long as the constituents who are acting on behalf of the 
yet-to-be-formed entity understand and agree to the entity being the client”).  
138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. e (“A lawyer may avoid 
liability to nonclients . . . by making clear that an opinion or representation is directed only 
to a client and should not be relied on by others.”). 
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the prospective buyer may receive and rely on the lawyer’s opinion, the 
lawyer undertakes a duty of competence to that non-client.139   
 
 In contrast, it is implausible that a lawyer who files a class action 
complaint on behalf of an individual seeking to serve as class representative 
thereby agrees with (1) absent class members, (2) the individual client, or 
(3) the nascent class, to serve absent class members, or the nascent class, 
competently or loyally.  The filing plainly is not preceded by an agreement 
between the lawyer and the absent class members: The lawyer may have 
no interaction at all with absent class members, who, for their part, may be 
unaware of the lawsuit.  Nor does the filing necessarily connote the lawyer’s 
agreement with the individual client to serve absent class members as 
beneficiaries.  As the case law reflects, the individual class members may 
opt to exploit the class action in various ways for their own benefit.  
Whether the individuals direct the lawyer to act partly or solely in the 
interests of absent class members is up to them.  And, of course, the lawyer 
has not agreed with the nascent, legally nonexistent class.    
 
 If the lawyer assumes duties to the nascent class, it cannot be by 
virtue of agreement, but only by operation of law.  The law can impose 
duties on lawyers beyond those to which lawyers agree.  For example, rules 
of professional conduct require lawyers to assume a host of duties to the 
court that may restrict lawyers’ ability to advance clients’ interests.140  
Lawyers assume confidentiality duties to prospective clients regardless of 
whether they agree to do so.141  And, indeed, the duties that lawyers owe to 
clients are largely established by professional conduct rules and agency 
law, not by contract. 
 
 For reasons others have identified, courts probably should declare, 
as some have, that lawyers filing class actions assume fiduciary duties to 
absent class members or to the nascent class.  Substantial work is typically 
performed prior to class certification with the court’s expectation that the 
lawyer is acting for the class’s benefit. Recognizing this, Rule 23 was 
amended in 2003 to allow the appointment of “interim” class counsel prior 
                                                 
139 Id. (a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient whom the lawyer invites to rely on 
the lawyer’s opinion, if the nonclient reasonably does so). 
140 See,	e.g., Rule 3.3(a)(3), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“If a lawyer, the 
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the 
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).  
141 See Rule 1.18(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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to adjudication of a certification motion.142  As the Advisory Committee 
Notes discuss, whether or not counsel is formally designated as “interim,” 
“[b]efore class certification . . . it will usually be important for an attorney 
to take action to prepare for the certification decision,” such as engaging in 
discovery relevant to certification, making or responding to other motions, 
and perhaps discussing settlement.143  
 
  If one concludes, as a matter of law, that the named plaintiff’s lawyer 
in a pre-certification class action must act in the best interests of the 
nascent class, even if it is not a client in a legal sense, the question then 
becomes, what are the scope and limits of the lawyer’s duties to the nascent 
class?  On this question, the law is not only unhelpful but conflicting.  In the 
context of individuals’ settlements, courts have relatively low expectations 
of the lawyers.  But in the context of pre-certification class settlements, 
courts have high expectations.  A lawyer who explores both individual and 
class settlements simultaneously cannot give primacy to both the 
individual’s interests and the class’s interests. 
 
At least in negotiating a settlement on behalf of a class 
representative individually, it might be argued that the lawyers’ fiduciary 
duty is, at most, to avoid affirmatively prejudicing absent class members.144  
Prior to the 2003 amendment to Rule 23, courts debated whether court 
approval was required when the class representative proposed to settle 
individually and dismiss the class action.  Courts expressed concern with 
settlements that used the threat of a class action to benefit the individual 
claimant, to the possible disadvantage of the absent class members.145  Even 
if absent class members were not legally bound by the settlement, they 
might have relied to their detriment on the assumption that the class action 
would be litigated.  They may have decided to await the outcome of the 
lawsuit rather than to take other available measures, such as filing an 
                                                 
142 Rule 23(g)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P.  
143 Advisory Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments to Rule 23.  
144 See	Landsman-Roos, supra note 133, at 842 (“the scope of those duties is limited to 
protecting the substantive legal rights of putative class members that form the basis of the 
class action suit from prejudice”).   
145 See,	e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66-67 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (“[T]he 
possibility of ‘legalized blackmail,’ . . .  and Rule 23 abuse is at its height during the pre-
certification stage when defendant is literally threatened by potential class-wide liability. 
Because the existence of a class has not been determined, the likelihood increases that 
plaintiff and his counsel will unduly sacrifice the previously-asserted class interest for 
private gain.”). 
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individual action, filing their own class action, or competing to serve as class 
representative and proposing a different lawyer to serve as class counsel.  
Courts took various approaches to the problem of individual settlements, 
with most concluding that notice to absent class members and judicial 
review were necessary if there was a risk that absent class members would 
be prejudiced.146  Rule 23(e) now requires notice and court approval only 
if class members would be bound by the proposed settlement, which is not 
ordinarily the case if the defendant compensates the named plaintiff for 
dismissing the lawsuit before the class is certified.  One might infer that the 
lawyer’s duty to the nascent class, if any, is simply to avoid absent class 
members’ detrimental reliance on the lawsuit. 
 
 The court will expect more from class counsel, however, if the 
lawyers negotiated a settlement for the class during the pre-certification 
stage, and then ask the court both to certify the class and to approve the 
settlement.147  At that point, the court’s responsibility is to assure that, in 
negotiating the settlement, the lawyer acted in the best interest of the class, 
not the named plaintiff.148  Looking backward in time, this suggests that the 
court will expect the lawyer to have treated the nascent class as a client 
during the negotiation stage and, indeed, as between the nascent class and 
the class representative, to have given primacy to the nascent class’s 
interests.  The lawyer may regard loyalty to the nascent class as a fiduciary 
duty to the nascent class, as an element of competent representation of the 
individual who brought the class action, or simply as a procedural 
obligation implicit in Rule 23. 
 
 The ideas that lawyers, in the pre-certification stage, may seek to 
advance the individual’s interests in disregard of the absent class members, 
but at the same time must give primacy to the class’s interests with virtual 
disregard of the individual client’s interests, seem hard to reconcilable.  But 
                                                 
146 See,	 e.g., Schemmer v. Chartone, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35020, *3 (N.D. Ohio 
2008): Anderberg v. Masonite Corp., 176 F.R.D. 682 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
147 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (stating that proposals 
to jointly certify and settle a class action require the courts to “close” and “heightened” 
scrutiny to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met).  
148 See,	e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The 
principal issue presented by these appeals is whether the district judge discharged the 
judicial duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation from lawyers for 
the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary obligations, place their 
pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class. This problem, repeatedly remarked by 
judges and scholars  . . . requires district judges to exercise the highest degree of vigilance 
in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.”).  
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one possible explanation is that the duties owed to the nascent class are not 
static and unchangeable; rather, they may evolve as the class action 
progresses (e.g., as absent class members’ reliance grows) or differ 
depending on the task being performed.149   
 
Of course, a distinction between the lawyer’s duties pre- or post-
appointment as interim lead counsel, or as counsel to a certified class, is 
artificial.150  The class is a legal construct that could be constructed at 
earlier or later points in the lawsuit.  Jean Wegman Burns has proposed, for 
example, that class counsel should be required to represent the class from 
the time a class action is filed, and that class representatives should be 
replaced with another mechanism for monitoring class counsel.151  At that 
point, the conflict of interest problem would have a straightforward 
solution: barring class counsel from representing individual class members.  
Even under the current regime, it is unclear why certification should be the 
dividing line.  Absent class members’ reliance interests, or other interests, 
may not change significantly simply because the class is certified.  Likewise, 
it seems odd to think that the lawyer’s loyalty to the class in negotiating a 
class settlement, and therefore the lawyer’s approach to the negotiations, 
should differ depending on whether the lawyer is negotiating for the 
nascent class prior to certification or for the class as a “client” after class 
certification.   
 
IV. WHAT SHOULD LAWYERS DO? 
	
That the law is unclear, and that courts seem indifferent, does not 
relieve lawyers of their ethical duties to individual clients.  Class action law 
may define or inform the nature and scope of a lawyer’s duties toward the 
“class as a whole,” absent class members, and class representatives.  But if 
individuals are represented as individuals, a lawyer must still comply with 
                                                 
149 See Larkin Gen. Hosp., Ltd. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 501-02 (E.D. Pa. 
1982).  One might also consider whether the lawyer’s duties expand if the lawyer is 
appointed to serve as “interim class counsel” under Rule 23(g)(3): Rule 23(g)(4) calls on 
class counsel to “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” and this 
arguably applies to interim class counsel as well.   
150 See Landsman-Roos, supra note 133, at 840 (“[I]mposing different pre-and 
postcertification fiduciary duties is an artificial, counterintuitive distinction. Nothing 
changes in terms of an absent class member's reliance on an attorney before and after 
certification. Likewise, the level of control an attorney has over an absent class member's 
relevant asset - that is, his claim - remains the same pre-and postcertification.”). 
151 Jean Wegman Burns,	Decorative	Figureheads:	Eliminating	Class	Representation	 in	
Class	Actions, 42 Hastings L.J. 165 (1990). 
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their state-adopted version of the Model Rules governing communications 
with, and disclosures to, a client – e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.4 and 1.7, among 
others.  Lawyers need to explain both how they propose to act in light of the 
legal uncertainty and how the uncertainty may add to the risks.  Therefore, 
they must take a position in light of the jurisdiction’s law regarding their 
pre- and post-certification duties.	
	
Lawyers should explain the ground rules of the class action to their 
individual clients, and talk through important issues and questions that 
may arise. Will the lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of the individual be limited 
by legal duties to the class or the lawyer’s own financial (and perhaps 
reputational) interest in seeing the class certified?  Is there a risk that the 
lawyer’s advice will be untrustworthy, because the lawyer will be taking 
account of the class’s interests?  Is there a risk that the lawyer will have to 
withdraw from representing the individual in order to continue the class 
representation?  Is there a risk that, if a class is not certified, the lawyer will 
seek to drop the individual client because the matter is no longer likely to 
be substantially remunerative?  These should be substantial, detailed 
communications.152  
 
In our view, lawyers should at the outset of the representation 
inform their individual clients of those rights which the pressures and 
incentives of concurrent class litigation might lead the lawyer to later 
downgrade or ignore.  For example, an individual client might be informed 
of her absolute right to seek a settlement at any time and to approve or 
disapprove any settlement offer.  An individual client might also usefully be 
informed of the right to have her attorney keep her reasonably informed of 
the status of the matter, and to fully inform her about potential conflicts.  
 
One cannot eavesdrop on privileged communications between class 
actions lawyers and individual clients to know whether these kinds of 
communications occur.  Our sense that they rarely do is based on a dearth 
of case law or professional literature recommending or mandating such 
communications, and the fact that almost all of the retainer agreements we 
reviewed were brief and vague. If our intuition is correct, then any 
communication along the lines proposed would improve on the status quo.  
 
 One approach that some lawyers take seems improper.  Some 
                                                 
152 Cf. Rule 1.4(b), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall explain a 
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation.”). 
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retainer agreements we reviewed contemplate an individual 
representation and a filing for class certification, and then state that the 
client waives all future conflicts,153 or agrees to be dropped as a client if any 
future conflicts arise.154  Such a barebones waiver provision is antithetical 
to the concept of “informed consent” in the context of conflicts of interest.  
Informed consent ordinarily requires an explanation of the facts giving rise 
to a conflict of interest, and an explanation of the risks, benefits and 
alternatives.155  Many courts are skeptical of advanced waivers of conflicts 
of interest, precisely because the relevant facts giving risk to a conflict are 
not yet known.156  At a minimum, for consent to be effective in advance of a 
conflict arising, there must be an explanation, at least in general terms, of 
the conflict of interest that is anticipated to arise and the implications.  
Beyond that, a client cannot be asked to waive all future conflicts without 
elaboration because not all are subject to waiver, or consent, under the 
professional conduct rules.  Therefore, even for a sophisticated class 
representative, the pro forma waiver provision will not suffice. 
 
Nor can individual clients be asked to contract in advance that they 
will follow their lawyer’s direction about whether to settle.  Settlement is 
carved out by the Model Rules as a decision that “must . . . be made by the 
client.”157  One might say that clients are actually making the decision if they 
voluntarily decide in advance to follow the lawyer’s advice.  But that seems 
to violate the clear purpose of the rule, which is to preserve individual client 
autonomy, informed but not controlled by legal counsel, over the 
                                                 
153 See Class Action Engagement Agreement, ECF No. 161-26, Gazzara	v.	Pulte	Home	
Corp., No. 6:16-cv-00657 (M.D. Fla.) (“[T]he Attorneys will be separately providing legal 
representation to you at the same time that they will be providing legal representation to 
other owners of homes, townhomes and condominiums against the builder of your 
residence . . . . [Y]ou and other owners have each agreed to waive any conflict of interest 
arising out of, and that you will not object to, our representation of each other in the matter 
described herein.”). 
154 See Letter from Frank E. Marchetti to Christine Anderson, ECF No. 16-1, Anderson	v.	
PODS	of	Los	Angeles,	LLC, No. 2:13-cv-04893 (C.D. Cal.) (“You understand that Attorney will 
not be able to represent you if Attorney’s representation of you would create a conflict 
with one of the Attorney’s existing clients . . . . You expressly agree to immediately consent 
to Attorney substituting out as your attorney of record after a lawsuit is filed if Attorney 
learns through discovery of such a conflict.”). 
155 Rule 1.0(e), ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
156 See,	e.g., Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359-60 
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding waiver language too vague).	
157 Rule 1.2(a) comment 1, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (discussing Model 
Rule 1.2(a)).  
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“objectives” of the representation.158  We therefore think that it is unethical 
for putative class counsel to ask their individual clients to agree to delegate 
the settlement decision, whether in an initial retainer agreement or later 
on. 
 
The concerns we raise, and disclosures we suggest, may be less 
relevant when the individual client is a sophisticated one—whether a 
natural person or an entity—and when the client has other representation, 
whether in-house lawyer employees or outside representation.  After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the individual client of class 
counsel is very likely to be a sophisticated institutional investor with in-
house counsel,159 and so securities litigation may well raise fewer concerns 
than other types of class actions. 
 
V. WHAT SHOULD RULEMAKERS AND TRIAL COURTS DO? 
 
We have shown that a certain kind of conflict is endemic in class 
actions and is not being addressed.  If courts or other rulemakers were to 
pay attention to the conflicts problem we have identified, a number of 
questions would arise.  There is the threshold question of whether new 
rules, standards, or procedures are needed, or whether existing law simply 
needs to be more vigorously or differently applied.  If new guidance is 
needed, there is the institutional choice question of who should formulate 
and who should apply it. Relatedly we must ask what a new legal rule, 
standard, or procedure should say.  
 
As discussed, current law and practice do not appear to understand 
the conflicts we identify to be serious ones, and thus have not offered 
solutions.  Some change over the status quo is warranted.  In the previous 
section we suggested that class counsel or putative class counsel who also 
have an individual lawyer-client relationship should consider making 
certain kinds of disclosures to the individual clients to address potential 
conflicts, and consider seeking informed consent to waive actual or 
potential conflicts.  But the class also must be protected, and absent class 
members cannot give consent or receive adequate counseling.  Because of 
their absentee status, and their typically low knowledge or investment in 
the class litigation, district court judges oversee class counsel and, when 
                                                 
158 Rule 1.2(a). 
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (mandating a rebuttable presumption that 
the lead plaintiff appointed by the court in a securities class action will be the investor with 
“the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class”). 
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necessary, protect absent class members from potential overreaching or 
exploitation.  Simply making class counsel more aware of the conflicts we 
identify is not sufficient.    
 
Courts handling class actions are often reluctant to apply the ABA 
Model Rules or state counterparts addressing conflicts if they think that 
policies of Rule 23 or the practical imperative to keep moving litigation to a 
resolution will be hampered thereby.  One might ask whether the conflicts 
we identify could be appropriately addressed if federal courts were willing 
to simply apply Model Rule 1.7 or other conflict rules as written to the 
representation of classes.160  (In the previous section we advocated greater 
compliance with the Model Rules approach by class counsel when 
interacting with their individual clients.) 
 
 It is not as easy to dismiss the idea that the standard conflict rules 
should govern the propriety of a lawyer’s joint representation of a class and 
a class representative, just as they would govern the joint representation of 
a corporation and a corporate officer.  There would be nothing exceptional 
about applying Rule 1.7 in this context, other than that the court’s 
authorization would have to substitute for the class’s informed consent.161  
If some other standard should apply, the reason is simply that class 
counsel’s conflict is different from the conflicts that Rule 1.7 ordinarily 
addresses and that courts, in overseeing class actions, are in a position to 
develop and enforce a standard that makes better sense in this context. 
 
On the other hand, conflict rules are written to cover situations 
where there are no courts to oversee the lawyers, and may therefore tend 
to be more protective and more categorical than courts need to be in class 
action litigation, in which there is substantial judicial oversight.162  The 
district courts serve as the gatekeeper of four things that plaintiff-side class 
action lawyers greatly desire: class certification, appointment as class 
counsel, approval of settlements, and approval of fees.163  District courts 
therefore inherently have the attention of class action lawyers, and have 
well-defined points during the litigation in which they interact with and can 
monitor lawyers.  
                                                 
160 See	generally Kane, supra	note 12, at 389-90 (advocating for more effective judicial 
oversight to address the possibility that class counsel may favor the class representatives’ 
interests). 
161 See Miller, supra note 11, at 588 (“review by the court substitutes for consent”). 
162 See,	e.g., Green, supra note 24, at 127.	 
163 See Rule 23(c)(1)(A), (e)(2), (g), (h).  
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by courts, 
already require class counsel to provide information to the court about 
conflicts as relevant to certification or settlement decisions, and judicial 
doctrine further requires that even “potential” conflicts be brought to the 
court’s attention.164 With this robust structure in place for judicial 
oversight, overly protective and categorical ethics rules written to be 
applied by lawyers themselves are arguably inappropriate.165   
 
If the current Model Rules approach is not the best fit, the question 
is then who might craft a better approach, and what that approach would 
be.  On the question of institutional choice, one possibility would be for the 
ABA to develop a Model Rule that addresses conflicts in class actions 
specifically, including the type on which we have focused.  Another 
possibility would be for the Rules Enabling Act process to be used to amend 
Rule 23.  The federal rulemaking process is likely to involve greater 
participation by different constituencies166 than would be the case with an 
ABA-controlled process.  Moreover, some commentators worry that the 
ABA’s output might tend to be “lowest common denominator” because of 
the need to reach agreement from the ABA House of Delegates and other 
factors.167  Whether or not that is true, there is reason to fear that a new 
ABA rule would not have as much effect as reform at the federal law.  As 
noted above, many federal courts of appeals have expressly stated that they 
feel free to depart from ordinary conflicts principles found in the Model 
Rules when necessary to successfully manage class actions. Outside the 
                                                 
164 See	supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
165 See Green supra note 24, at 126-28;	 Jonathan R. Macey, & Geoffrey P. Miller, The	
Plaintiffs’	Attorney’s	Role	in	Class	Action	and	Derivative	Litigation:	Economic	Analysis	and	
Recommendations	for	Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 97 (1997). Some commentators would 
apply, or give considerable weight, to the conflict rules. See,	e.g.,	Bassett, supra note 13, at 
965 (“Nothing in Federal Rule 23 exempts counsel from the ethical rules, and the rules’ 
applicability to all practicing attorneys does not take a holiday when an attorney chooses 
to represent a class rather than an individual.”); Stuhan & Costello, supra note 11, at 1206 
(“[I]t would be a mistake to jettison ethical considerations in the class certification 
decision-making process altogether.  The rules, while not necessarily controlling, should 
inform the analysis.”). 
166 See	generally Peter G. McCabe, Renewal	of	the	Federal	Rulemaking	Process, 44 AM. 
U.L. REV. 1655 (1995). 
167 WOLFRAM, supra note 15, § 2.6.1 at 49; see	also	id. (“Once a number of lawyers defy a 
code rule (or are believed by other lawyers to have taken a negative stance), the rule will 
be widely ignored because of competitive pressures and a sense of unfairness. In that view 
of professional sociology, the area left for regulation is a relatively narrow range that falls 
between marginally enforceable rules and insubstantial ones.”). 
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class action context, federal courts exercise supervisory authority (e.g., in 
ruling on disqualification motions) in common-law fashion to develop and 
apply their own legal standards governing attorney conflicts.168 That is, 
federal courts sometimes deny disqualification even when the lawyer has 
an impermissible conflict under the rules, because the court recognizes that 
there are interests at stake for which the rules do not adequately account.  
Likewise, courts sometimes disqualify lawyers on account of conflicts of 
interest even when professional conduct rules would permit the 
representation.169  The federal courts seem unlikely to relinquish this 
independent, case-by-case approach even if the ABA wrote a new rule 
tailored to class action conflicts. 
 
It would be helpful, we think, for Rule 23 to be amended to make 
explicit that conflicts of interest should receive the sustained attention of 
courts overseeing class actions. We see no good reason why Rule 
23(g)(1)(A) should not expressly mention conflicts. 
  
Unfortunately, it may be too much to expect that an amendment to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be generated to address the 
conflicts explored in this article.  Observers of the last attempts by the 
Advisory Committee to amend Rule 23 have noted that only relatively 
uncontroversial and insignificant changes have been approved.170  The 
Supreme Court seems to value its ability to effectively write and rewrite 
rules of civil procedure via adjudication, and to be less interested in using 
the much more cumbersome rule-making process.  Muddling through by 
lower federal courts, with a slight possibility of clarification by the Supreme 
Court, may be the best that can reasonably be hoped for. 
 
What should this muddling look like?  There are a range of relevant 
considerations. First, there are considerations of fairness to the individual 
clients who might be required to forgo their chosen lawyers, with whom 
they have a sustained relationship.  This is a situation for which the 
individuals are not to blame, and that is essentially unavoidable and 
intrinsic to class action procedure.  Under the present law, the named 
plaintiff remains an individual client at least until the class is certified, 
which, in the case of pre-certification settlements, is virtually the end of the 
case.  It may seem unfair to require individual clients to give up their 
                                                 
168 See Green, supra note 24, at 77-78, 120-22.  
169 See,	e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
170 See,	e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class	Actions	and	the	Counterrevolution	
Against	Federal	Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1514-16 (2017). 
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lawyers at a midpoint or late point in the lawsuit.  This sometimes occurs 
in a joint representation when a conflict of interest unexpectedly emerges, 
but clients in that situation have a choice whether to be jointly represented 
and assume the risk that a conflict will later require the lawyer to withdraw.  
And this problem cannot be solved at no cost by appointing a different 
lawyer to serve as class counsel.  It would not be in the class’s best interest 
to be assigned a different lawyer who has no client in the matter and 
therefore no prior familiarity or relationship with either the matter or the 
class representatives.   
 
Another consideration is whether disapproving of the joint 
representation would avert the problems that it poses.  Would class 
counsel, who would now be a class representative’s former lawyer, favor 
the class representative to a lesser extent, or would the lawyer’s 
withdrawal from the individual representation be essentially meaningless?  
Representing the class alone would solve some problems: the lawyer would 
have no authority to negotiate a deal for the class representative 
individually and no obligation as a matter of loyalty to encourage the class 
representative to object to a settlement or to pursue separate 
compensation.  But the literature suggests that class counsel sometimes 
favor the class representatives, with whom they have personal dealings, 
over absent class members.  In that event, formally terminating the 
representation in the class action alone is unlikely to diminish the lawyer’s 
loyalty to the class representative. 
 
Yet another question is the frequency with which nascent conflicts 
become manifest.  That is an empirical question on which there appears to 
be no research.  But courts may make assumptions based on their own 
experience, interactions and study.  If courts have not seen the problem 
arise very often in their own and their colleagues’ courtrooms, it is easy to 
be dismissive. 
 
Courts might also take account of the extent to which a conflict, if it 
becomes manifest, is likely to be harmful.  One’s assessment of harm turns, 
in part, on one’s understanding of the class’s interests.  If one thinks that 
absent class members do not have a significant reliance interest at the pre-
certification stage, then one will not be too troubled by the prospect that 
the class representative will sell out the nascent class with the lawyer’s 
assistance by leveraging the class action to achieve a favorable personal 
settlement.  This assessment also depends on courts’ confidence in their 
ability to prevent or avert harm to the class by overseeing the class action.  
If judges believe that they can discern when a lawyer disserved the class 
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because of a conflict of interest, and believe they have the resources to 
redress the problem, then there may be little reason to be proactive or 
restrictive.   
 
And, of course, courts will take account of the administrability and 
burdensomeness of any alternative to doing nothing until a problem 
screams out.  Courts almost always place weight on the interest in judicial 
economy.171  Almost any alternative will be more costly than the status quo.  
Certainly, implementing the conflict rules at the pre-certification or 
certification stage of a class action will impose a cost on the court, which, as 
a proxy for the class, would presumably have to hold a hearing and make a 
ruling on the permissibility of the joint representation.  Ordinarily, conflict 
rules are implemented by the lawyers alone, and therefore courts may be 
unconcerned about whatever burdens they impose.  
 
While this discussion identifies various unresolved questions, one 
can understand why trial judges would be inclined to view class counsel’s 
representation of class representatives as a Rule 23 problem to be managed 
in a contextual, case-by-case manner, not a Rule 1.7 question to be given a 
more categorical answer.  The problem is distinctive in various respects and 
implicates considerations of class action policy and judicial policy 
generally.  The one-size-fits-all conflict rules may not be best suited to this 
situation. 
 
One can also understand why courts might tacitly adopt and apply a 
Rule 23 standard that calls for ignoring the joint representation until a 
party raises it as a problem.  While courts do not appear to have undertaken 
any explicit analysis, they may tacitly conclude that: it would be unfair to 
the individual clients to deprive them of their lawyers and disadvantageous 
to the class to appoint a different lawyer; in most cases, the joint 
representation will not result in manifest conflict that creates significant 
harm that could be averted by forbidding or terminating the joint 
representation; and anyway, the problem is not worth the courts’ time.  
Further, the lawyers involved in class actions have little incentive to 
disabuse courts of this assumption.  In general, no one benefits from a 
stricter or more labor-intensive approach, since many who vie to be 
selected as class counsel are likely to have an individual client. 
 
Given the legal framework established by Rule 23, this is a 
                                                 
171 Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982) (stating that “efficiency 
and economy” are “a principal purpose” of the class action). 
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reasonable approach.  It is not feasible for courts to require lawyers for the 
nascent class to withdraw from representing individual class members, and 
at the time of class certification, the risks to the class created by the joint 
representation do not loom large enough to justify requiring class 
representatives to relinquish the lawyers who represented them prior to 
filing the class action lawsuit. 
 
Less reasonable is courts failure to acknowledge the problem 
described in this Article and to develop a jurisprudence that offers guidance 
to plaintiffs’ lawyers in class actions about how to reconcile the ethical and 
fiduciary duties they owe to a class or nascent class with those they owe to 
an individual class member at various stages of a class action, including in 
the context of the holdout, sellout and payout scenarios described in Part II.  
If the Model Rules are inapplicable or subject to implicit override by the 
policies of Rule 23, then lawyers need guidance from elsewhere, and courts, 
which have a supervisory responsibility over class actions and over the bar 
generally, are the obvious place to look. 
 
Among the questions that courts should resolve are, first, what 
duties does the lawyer owe prior to class certification to the nascent class 
or to absent class members and when they arise.  Without knowing the 
scope of the representation, the lawyer cannot know whether serving the 
interest of the putative class representative at the expense of the nascent 
class constitutes a fiduciary breach and a conflict of interest or doing so is 
entirely legitimate.  Second, based on the resolution of this question, courts 
should set forth their expectations when there is a significant risk that the 
lawyer’s duties to the class, or nascent class, will be compromised.  
Presumably, the Model Rules address the risk to the class representative 
and, in any event, that is not the court’s principal concern under Rule 23.  
But courts are supposed to develop standards and procedures to address 
when class counsel is compromising or jeopardizing the class’s interests.  
Courts should whether and when lawyers should raise this problem with 
the trial court, as they would other conflicts of interest, and, if not, how 
lawyers should resolve the problem on their own.    
 
Whether courts should seek assurances from plaintiffs’ lawyers at 
the outset of a class action lawsuit that they have reached an appropriate 
understanding with their individual clients is a harder question.  In the 
absence of an appropriate understanding, class counsel may be under even 
greater pressure than otherwise to serve the individual client’s interests at 
the expense of the class.  If lawyers acknowledge and explain to their 
individual clients the limits of their loyalty to the client and the scenarios 
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that may require the lawyer to withdraw, lawyers will find it easier to 
comply with these expectations.  If so, trial courts’ responsibility to protect 
the class may call for some kind of inquiry.  
 
We recommend that, in any class action except those led by 
sophisticated entity plaintiffs, such as many securities class actions 
governed by the PSLRA, district courts should inquire at the outset whether 
class counsel is also representing any class members as individuals and, if 
so, should require counsel to file with the court any retainer agreements or 
other documents setting forth the scope and basis of the attorney-client 
arrangement. If counsel had oral conversations with individual clients 
about potential conflicts, the court should require that these be reduced to 
writing.  Any documents containing attorney-client privileged information 
or opinion work product could be filed in	camera for judicial review only. 
District courts should also remind counsel of their continuing obligation to 
bring potential or actual conflicts that develop later to the courts’ attention. 
 
Once courts set forth clear expectations, however, there may be no 
need for oversight other than in the relatively infrequent cases in which 
problems will be called to their attention.  Moreover, it would be 
burdensome on courts to question class representatives and their lawyers 
to ensure that their have reached an understanding that will adequately 
protect not only the individual client but the class or nascent class.  Our 
point, therefore, is not that courts must go to lengths to police lawyers’ 
compliance with judicial expectations, it is simply that courts have been 
remiss in failing to elaborate on their expectations in the first place 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For decades, courts and commentators have been well aware that 
“[i]nherent in any class action is the potential for conflicting interests 
among the class representatives, class counsel, and absent class 
members.”172  Notwithstanding this realization and a substantial amount of 
scholarly and judicial commentary on class action conflicts, we believe that 
one kind of conflict has not received due attention: the conflict that 
inevitably arises when class counsel also represents individual class 
members as individuals.  We have shown that this kind of conflict arises 
from the very beginning of a putative class representation, and predictably 
                                                 
172 Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Accord Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“[C]onflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action.”). 
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will put the lawyer for the class and the individual in fraught positions with 
regard to the conflicting interests of the class and the individual.  The more 
radical possible solutions—for instance, banning concurrent 
representation of a class and an individual class member on an individual 
basis—call to mind the medical adage about avoiding cures that are worse 
than the disease.  We have therefore recommended more measured 
responses, primarily (1) greater disclosure of risks to individual clients by 
their attorneys, and (2) greater judicial oversight.  
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